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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM:
AN EVALUATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR MODERATE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
ScoTr FRUEHWALDt
"The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States."--Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase1
"IT]he constitutional equality of the states is essential to the harmo-
nious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was organ-
ized."-Justice Horace H. Lurton
2
Horizontal federalism is an essential part of our Constitution. Pro-
fessor Steven G. Calabresi has observed, "[t]he constitutional text's over-
reaching concern is with questions of institutional competence, and its
main theme is the division and allocation of power with a focus on who
decides what questions and subject to what checks and balances.,
3 Part
of this division of power concerns federalism-the allocation of author-
ity between the federal government and the states (vertical federalism)
and the allocation of authority among the states (horizontal federalism).
This allocation of authority protects both the individual and the states. As
James Madison declared:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the peo-
ple. The different governments will control each other, at the same
time that each will be controlled by itself.
4
t Instructor, Hofstra University School of Law. University of Louisville (B.M., 1977; J.D.,
1989); University of North Carolina (M.A., 1979); City University of New York (Ph.D., 1984);
University of Virginia (L.L.M., 1994; S.J.D., 2001).
1. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
2. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
3. Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1373, 1373 (1998).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., The Easton Press
1979).
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Similarly, Professor John C. Yoo has asserted, "[s]overeignty is not
maintained for sovereignty's sake, but instead is necessary to check those
driven by power for power's sake."5
Vertical federalism has been a major concern of the Rehnquist
Court. In a series of cases, the Court has protected states' rights from
imposition by the federal government. 6 First, the Court has limited Con-
gress' power to pass statutes that infringe upon state sovereignty under
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.7 Second, the Court has enforced the "eti-
quette of federalism" 8 by forbidding Congress from "commandeer[ing]
the legislative processes of the States..."9 or commanding state officers
"to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." 10 Finally, the
Court has limited Congress' ability to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity. "
The Rehnquist Court has not been similarly concerned with hori-
zontal federalism-the relations among the states. With the exception of
one limited area (due process limits on punitive damages), the Court has
not created new constraints, it has continued the minimal restrictions on
horizontal federalism from previous Courts, and, in one instance, it has
retreated from the constraints created by prior Courts. Three cases from
the 2002-2003 term, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,12 which concerns due process limits on punitive damages
awards, Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,13 which involves the Full Faith
5. John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv.
27, 32 (1998).
6. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002); Bd. of Trs. of
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 351 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627
(2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
709-10 (1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (concluding that the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
the Missouri Constitution's mandatory retirement provision for judges). But see Nev. Dep't of Hu-
man Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977, 1981 (2003) (holding that it was within Congress' author-
ity to allow state employees to recover money damages in federal court where the state failed to
comply with the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), despite Elev-
enth Amendment immunity, because the FMLA provision was congruent and proportional to the
targeted gender discrimination).
7. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
8. Printz, 521 U.S. at 964 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
9. Id. at 963 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981)); New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
10. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
11. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 769; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91-
92; Alden, 527 U.S. at 709-10; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647-48;
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76; see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 473 (concluding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not prohibit Missouri's mandatory retirement provision for judges).
12. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
13. 123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003).
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and Credit Clause, and Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of
America v. Walsh,14 which concerns dormant commerce clause limits,
vividly illustrate the Court's minimal and selective horizontal federalism
jurisprudence.
Michael Greve has criticized the Rehnquist Court's horizontal fed-
eralismjurisprudence that existed prior to the 2002-2003 term:
The Rehnquist Court has waged its federalism campaign on be-
half of "states' rights" against national impositions, but the rehabilita-
tion of a plausible, constitutional federalism is a two-front war. Fed-
eralism surely must limit the national government's powers over the
states and protect intergovernmental immunities . . . . However, it
must also protect states from aggression and exploitation by other
states; moreover, it must protect the common economic market from
regulatory balkanization.15
Before the New Deal Court, there were significant constitutional
constraints on state power. 16 That Court eliminated or limited restrictions
on state authority in the following areas: (1) the Court eliminated sub-
stantive due process; (2) the Court drastically scaled back the scope of
the dormant commerce clause; (3) the Court reduced the impact of fed-
eral statutes on the states by replacing the automatic preemption of state
law by federal law in the same area with a presumption against preemp-
tion; (4) the Court virtually halted the application of parts of the Bill of
Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; (5) the Court
enhanced state judicial power through the Erie doctrine, which requires
the use of state law in diversity cases; and (6) the Court increased state
judicial power by creating federal court abstention, by expanding state
court territorial jurisdiction, and by significantly reducing constitutional
constraints on state choice of law.1 7 Although the Court created a balanc-
ing approach to the dormant commerce clause beginning with Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona18 in 1945 and returned to a substantive due proc-
ess analysis of fundamental rights in Griswold v. Connecticut'9 in 1965,
14. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
15. Michael S. Greve, Federalism's Frontier, 7 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 93, 95 (2002); see also
Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in Theory and Practice, 83 MARQ.
L. REV. 435, 494 (1999) ("While previous cases have focused on vertical federalism, there is also a
great need to police the relation of the states.") [hereinafter Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels].
16. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States,
64 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 487 (1997). Some of these constraints are horizontal, such as constitutional
constraints on a state's choice of law, while others, such as substantive due process and federal
preemption are vertical.
17. Id. at 488-89.
18. 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945); see Gradbaum, supra note 16, at 509-10, 529-30.
By 1949 at the latest, and probably by 1945, a majority of the Court was persuaded to re-
treat from the full radicalism of 1938. Nonetheless, overall the "modem approach" to the
dormant Commerce Clause that was forged in these years reflects a significantly less na-
tionalistic vision than the predominant one during the Lochner era.
Id. at 509.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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most of the minimal constraints on state power from the New Deal Court
remain today.
This author believes that the Court should give as much attention to
horizontal federalism as it has given to vertical federalism. States can
interfere with state sovereignty almost as much as the federal govern-
ment can interfere with state sovereignty. Equally important, an individ-
ual should not be subject to a state extending its laws beyond its author-
ity. In addition, these greater constraints on horizontal federalism should
be created in a principled manner based on a neutral reading of the Con-
stitution's structural provisions.
This Article will concentrate on three constitutional provisions that
regulate the relations among the states:20 (1) the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment;21 (2) the Full Faith and Credit Clause;22 and
(3) the dormant commerce clause.23 The Due Process Clause regulates
the relationship between the state and the individual, and it should pre-
vent a state from applying its laws to an individual when that state has a
tenuous connection to the individual or controversy. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause requires that states recognize the laws and judgments of
other states, and it should preclude a state from extending its authority in
a way that interferes with the sovereignty of other states. Finally, the
dormant commerce clause protects the states as a whole, and it should
prohibit a state from regulating the market beyond its borders and dis-
criminating against interstate commerce.
Part I of this Article will examine the strong due process constraints
the Court has placed on a state's authority to impose punitive damages in
torts cases based on conduct in other states. It will conclude that those
limits are proper under the Due Process Clause, but that the Court has not
properly stated the basis for those limits. Part II will discuss the Court's
Full Faith and Credit Clause cases concerning choice of law and judg-
ments. Part I will conclude that the Court has given almost no content to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause in choice of law cases and it has im-
properly created exceptions to full faith and credit for judgments. It will
also propose a consistent standard for giving full faith and credit to an-
other state's laws and judgments. Part II will evaluate the Court's ap-
20. Other clauses that relate to horizontal federalism or regulation of the states include U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10; the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, §§ 2, 3; the Supremacy Clause,
id. art. VI, cl. 2; amend. XIV. In addition, the structure of the Constitution, as a whole, supports
limits on horizontal federalism. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1885 (1987) ("The truth, I shall argue presently, is that the extraterritoriality
principle is not to be located in any particular clause. It is one of those foundational principles of our
federalism which we infer from the structure of the Constitution as a whole.") [hereinafter Regan,
Siamese Essays]. I will not discuss vertical constraints, such as federal preemption, in this Article.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. Id. art. IV, § 1.
23. Id. art. I, § 8.
[Vol. 81:2
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
proach to the dormant commerce clause, and it will argue that the Court
has retreated from the proper dormant commerce clause analysis in its
latest important decision in this area, Pharmaceutical Research & Manu-
facturers of America v. Walsh.
Finally, Part IV will examine the Court's horizontal federalism ju-
risprudence as a whole. It will contend that the Court has no consistent
approach to horizontal federalism; rather, it has used horizontal federal-
ism to further its agenda in other areas, particularly concerning limits on
punitive damages awards. Specifically, the Court has placed strong due
process limits on punitive damages, it has given no content to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, and it has retreated from earlier constraints in its
latest dormant commerce clause decision. Part IV will then propose that
the Court adopt consistent, moderate constitutional constraints on hori-
zontal federalism based on the Constitution's structural provisions that
limit a state's ability to extend its laws beyond its authority but that do
not interfere with a state's proper sovereignty.
I. DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON STATE'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Due Process Limits in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Campbell 24 and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
25
The only area in which the Rehnquist Court has placed significant
limits on a state's authority to interfere with other states' powers in-
volves whether state court punitive damages awards violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 In BMW of North Amer-
ica, Inc. v. Gore, the Court struck down an Alabama court's award of
punitive damages against an automobile distributor for repainting a new
car without disclosing the repainting to the purchaser. 27 BMW had re-
painted the top, hood, trunk, and quarter panels of the car at a cost of
$601.37, which constituted approximately 1.5 percent of the suggested
retail price. 8 At that time, BMW had a nationwide policy that, if the
repair cost did not exceed three percent of the suggested retail price,
BMW sold the car as new without telling the dealer that repairs had been
24. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
25. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
26. See Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1517, 1522-23, 1526; Gore, 517 U.S. at 567-68; see also
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001) (concluding that the
court of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing a district court's deter-
mination of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 334 (1998) (concluding that a punitive forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause because it
was grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (holding that the punitive damages award did not violate due
process); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (recognizing that although the
punitive damages assessed were large in proportion to the compensatory damages, they did not
violate due process).
27. Gore, 517 U.S. at 563, 585.
28. Id. at 563-64, 563 n.1.
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made.29 The jury returned a verdict against BMW for $4,000 in compen-
satory damages and $4,000,000 in punitive damages. 3° The Alabama
Supreme Court reduced the punitive damages to $2,000,000. 3 1 The
United States Supreme Court reversed.32
Similarly, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, the Court held that a punitive damages award of $145,000,000
involving a $1,000,000 compensatory award in a Utah case against an
insurance company for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress violated the Due Process Clause.33 Campbell was involved
in an automobile accident in which one person was killed and another
was permanently disabled. 34 Although the parties reached an early con-
sensus that Campbell was at fault, Campbell's insurance company, State
Farm, decided to contest liability and refused offers to settle for the pol-
icy limits.35 The jury found against Campbell and awarded $185,849 to
the plaintiffs. State Farm refused to cover any excess liability, and it told
the Campbells, "[y]ou may want to put for sale signs on your property to
get things moving. ' 36 In addition, State Farm refused to post a su-
persedeas bond to allow Campbell to appeal.37
After the appellate court denied Campbell's appeal, State Farm paid
the entire amount, including the excess liability.38 However, the Camp-
bells sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.3 9 The trial court granted summary judgment for State
Farm because it had paid the excess amount, but an appellate court re-
versed.40 On remand, the trial court refused State Farm's motion to ex-
clude evidence of alleged conduct that occurred in unrelated cases out-
side the state.4' However, it reduced the jury award of $2,600,000 in
compensatory damages and $145,000,000 in punitive damages to
$1,000,000 and $25,000,000, respectively.42 Applying the test the United
States Supreme Court had developed in Gore, the Utah Supreme Court
reinstated the $145,000,000 punitive damages award.4 3 The United States
Supreme Court reversed on due process grounds.44
29. Id. at 563.
30. Id. at 565.
31. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 621 (Ala. 1994).
32. Gore, 517 U.S. at 586.
33. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1517-18, 1526.
34. Id. at 1517.
35. Id. at 1517-18.






42. Id. at 1519.
43. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1147-48 (Utah 2001).
44. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
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In punitive damages cases, the Court begins with the principle that
"[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legiti-
mate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repeti-
tion., 45 "Only when an award can fairly be categorized as 'grossly exces-
sive' in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 6
1. The Court's Due Process Test for Punitive Damages Cases
In determining a state's legitimate interest in imposing punitive
damages, the Court makes two due process inquiries: (1) whether a state
has exceeded its legislative authority47 and (2) whether the defendant had
fair warning "'not only of the conduct that will subject him to punish-
ment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.'48
The first inquiry concerns horizontal federalism-a state's power to ex-
tend its laws into other states. The second inquiry involves fairness-
notice and the severity of the punishment in relation to the misconduct.
The Court begins the first inquiry by looking at a basic tenet of fed-
eralism-that states may reasonably differ in their policy judgments.49
For example, in Gore, the Court found "a patchwork of rules represent-
ing the diverse policy judgments of lawmakers in 50 States., 50 The Court
has stated the basic principle of state sovereignty: "No State can legislate
except with reference to its own jurisdiction .... Each State is independ-
ent of all the others in this particular.' If a uniform national policy is
desired, Congress has the power to enact such a policy, but "it is clear
that no single State could do so, or even impose its own policy choice on
neighboring States., 52 "While each State has ample power to protect its
own consumers, none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a means
of imposing its regulatory policies on the entire Nation. 53 Accordingly,
45. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; see also Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20 (noting that although
states have discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, there are procedural and substantive
constitutional limits on these awards).
46. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568; see also Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1519-20 (noting that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbi-
trary awards).
47. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521-23; Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
48. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
49. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 568.
50. Id. at 570. For instance, some states have protected their citizens by requiring notice of
presale repairs that affect a car's value through legislation, while others have done so judicially. Id.
at 569. Other states may not have disclosure requirements if they believe they are unnecessary be-
cause of the automobile trade's self-interest in customer goodwill or if they believe the administra-
tive costs of full disclosure would raise car prices. Id. at 570. Finally, other states may want some
disclosure requirements, but want to exempt minor repairs. Id.
51. Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
52. Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
53. Id. at 585.
2003]
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"[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been law-
ful where it occurred.,
54
In addition, a state does not have a legitimate interest in imposing
punitive damages on a defendant for unlawful conduct outside that state,
and any such adjudication would require the inclusion of the affected
parties and the application of the relevant states' laws.55 Consequently, as
the Court stated in Gore, "one State's power to impose burdens on the
interstate market for automobiles is not only subordinate to the federal
power over interstate commerce, but is also constrained by the need to
respect the interests of other States."56 The Court has declared: "We
think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that
a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with
the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States. 57
Punishing a person for doing what the law allows him to do "is a due
process violation of the most basic sort.
' 58
In Gore, the plaintiff contended that the large punitive damages
award was needed to cause BMW to change its nationwide nondisclosure
policy.59 However, the Court found that "by attempting to alter BMW's
nationwide policy, Alabama would be infringing on the policy choices of
other States., 60 Alabama can only further its interest in protecting its own
consumers and its own economy; it lacks the power to punish conduct
that was lawful where it occurred and that did not affect Alabama or its
residents.61 Similarly, in Campbell, the Court thought that the case "was
used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of
State Farm's operations throughout the country. 62 The Court averred:
"From their opening statements onward the Campbells framed this case
as a chance to rebuke State Farm for its nationwide activities. 63
The second half of the due process inquiry regarding punitive dam-
ages involves fair warning and the prevention of the arbitrary deprivation
of property.64 The Court opined: "Indeed, the point of due process-of
the law in general-is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State
can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbi-
54. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522; see also Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73 (concluding that Ala-
bama cannot punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred).
55. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522.
56. Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (internal citations omitted).
57. Id. at 572.
58. Id. at 573 n. 19 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
59. Id. at 572.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 572-73.
62. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
63. Id. at 1522.
64. Id. at 1520.
[Vol. 81:2
HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
trary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon
bias or whim." 65 Similarly, Justice Breyer has declared:
This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the Magna
Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life,
liberty, or property, through the application, not of law and legal
processes, but of arbitrary coercion. Requiring the application of law,
rather than a decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide
citizens notice of what actions may subject them to punishment; it
also helps to assure the uniform general treatment of similarly situ-
ated persons that is the essence of law itself.
66
He continued: "Legal standards need not be precise in order to satisfy
this constitutional concern. . . .But they must offer some kind of con-
straint upon a jury or court's discretion, and thus protection against
purely arbitrary behavior., 67 The imposition of punitive damages impli-
cates such concerns when they are determined with vague jury instruc-
tions or evidence that has little bearing on the amount that should be
awarded.68
The fair notice inquiry used by the Rehnquist Court involves a
three-part test: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's mis-
conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered
by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 69 Concerning the first fac-
tor, degree of reprehensibility, "exemplary damages imposed on a defen-
dant should reflect 'the enormity of his offense"' and "the accepted view
that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others., 70 A court should
determine the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vul-
nerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery,
or deceit, or mere accident.
71
65. Id. at 1520 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
66. Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted); see Campbell,
123 S. Ct. at 1520.
67. Gore, 517 U.S. at 588.
68. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1520.
69. Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
70. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575.
71. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1521.
20031
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The Court added: "The existence of any one of these factors weighing in
favor of a plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages
award; and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.
72
Concerning the second factor, the disparity between compensatory
and punitive damages, the Court declared, "[t]he principle that exem-
plary damages must bear a 'reasonable relationship' to compensatory
damages has a long pedigree."73 Although a court cannot draw a bright-
line with this factor, "[w]hen the ratio is a breathtaking 500 to 1, how-
ever, the award must surely 'raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow."'74 In
addition, when there are substantial compensatory damages, a lesser ratio
between punitive damages and compensatory damages may be re-
quired.75
Finally, concerning the third factor, sanctions for comparable mis-
conduct, the Court has stated that courts should "'accord 'substantial
deference' to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for
the conduct at issue.', 76 Moreover, "[g]reat care must be taken to avoid
use of the civil process to access criminal penalties that can be imposed
only after the heightened protections of a criminal trial have been ob-
served, including, of course, its higher standards of proof.
77
2. Application of the Court's Punitive Damages Test in Campbell
and Gore
The punitive damages in Campbell failed the three-part test.78 First,
the Court held that the reprehensibility guidepost did not justify the im-
position of such large punitive damages. 79 As stated above, the existence
of out-of-state conduct cannot support punitive damages, and much of
the award in this case was based on out-of-state conduct.80 Moreover,
much of the alleged conduct was unrelated to the plaintiffs' harm. 8 The
Court asserted: "A defendant's dissimilar acts, independent from the acts
upon which liability was premised, may not serve as the basis for puni-
tive damages. A defendant should be punished for the conduct that
harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business.
82
Furthermore, the Court felt that the Campbells had not presented suffi-
cient evidence to establish that State Farm was a recidivist. 83 The Court
72. Id.
73. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
74. Id. at 583 (quoting TXO, 590 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
75. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1524.
76. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
77. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1526.
78. Id. at 1521.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1521-22.





concluded: "The reprehensibility guidepost does not permit courts to
expand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished for any
malfeasance .... 84
Second, the Court believed there was a presumption against the
constitutionality of punitive damages with a "145-to-i" punitive to com-
pensatory damages ratio.85 The Court also thought the compensatory
damages in this case included a punitive element; the trial court had
awarded the Campbells $1,000,000 in damages for eighteen months of
emotional distress.86 The Court also rejected arguments that the damages
were justified because State Farm had significant assets.87 Finally, the
significant disparity between the punitive damages and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases failed the third factor.88 The
Court stated that "[t]he most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law
for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine for an
act of fraud, an amount dwarfed by the $145 million punitive damages
award. 89
The punitive damages in Gore also failed the three-part test.90 First,
the Court held that there were no aggravating factors present that were
related to reprehensible conduct.91 The harm was wholly economic; the
repainting had no effect on the car's performance or safety.92 The Court
asserted: "That conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort
liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages does not estab-
lish the high degree of culpability that warrants a substantial punitive
damages award., 93 Second, the Court felt that the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages was excessive.94 The punitive damages
award was 500 times the compensatory damages award, and there was no
evidence that Gore or any other BMW buyer was subject to additional
harm by the nondisclosure. 95 Finally, concerning sanctions for compara-
ble conduct, the $2,000,000 punitive damages award was substantially
greater than statutory fines in Alabama or other states for this conduct.
96
Significantly, "at the time BMW's policy was first challenged, there does
not appear to have been any judicial decision in Alabama or elsewhere
indicating that application of that policy might give rise to such severe
84. Id. at 1524.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1524-25.
87. Id. at 1525 ("The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional
punitive damages award.").
88. Id. at 1526.
89. Id. (internal citation omitted).
90. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75.
91. Id. at 576.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 580.
94. Id. at 580-83.
95. Id. at 582.
96. Id. at 583-84.
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punishment., 97 The Court concluded: "We cannot... accept the conclu-
sion of the Alabama Supreme Court that BMW's conduct was suffi-
ciently egregious to justify a punitive sanction that is tantamount to a
severe criminal penalty. 98
B. Evaluation of the Court's Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
There are obviously some due process limits on a state's ability to
impose punitive damages, 99 and the Court's three-part test is an effective
means of evaluating those restrictions. However, some of the Court's
reasoning in Campbell and Gore is faulty, especially concerning the rea-
son the Due Process Clause constrains horizontal federalism.
Concerning the first part of the Court's due process analysis-
whether a state has exceeded its legitimate authority under the Due Proc-
ess Clause-the Court has wrongly stated that the due process test con-
cerns whether a state has burdened interstate commerce, whether a state
has imposed its policy choice on neighboring states, and whether a state
has respected other states' interests.l°° As has been demonstrated in per-
sonal jurisdiction cases and choice of law scholarship, due process has
nothing to do with state interests,' 0 ' and it certainly has nothing to do
with interstate commerce.10 2 Rather, the Due Process Clause concerns the
relationship between the state and the individual. 0 3 The Full Faith and
Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause govern the relationship of the
states and interstate commerce, respectively.l°4
Nevertheless, the Court is correct in finding that the Due Process
Clause affects horizontal federalism. 0 5 However, it does so by its regula-
tion of the relationship of the state and the individual. As Professor Terry
Kogan has declared: "In the context of legislative jurisdiction, the Con-
stitution should be viewed as primarily concerned with protecting indi-
viduals, not states, from overreaching by other states."' 6 The Rehnquist
97. Id. at 584.
98. Id. at 585.
99. See, e.g., id. at 562 (citing TXO, 509 U.S. at 454) (noting that the "Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a
tortfeasor").
100. Id. at 571; see supra notes 49-63 and accompanying text.
101. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10
(1982); EDWIN SCOTT FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW FOR AMERICAN COURTS: A
MULTILATERALIST METHOD 67-68 (2001) [hereinafter FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW]; see also
Martin H. Redish, Federalism, Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation,
75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112, 1113-14 (1981) (discussing the Due Process Clause as a shield against
individual injustices).
102. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305 (1992) (explaining that the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause differ in several ways).
103. See Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Choice of Law: The Priority of Fairness
over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 694 n.230 (1987); Martin H. Redish, Procedural Due Process
and Aggregation Devices in Mass Tort Litigation, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 18, 25 (1996).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. art. I, § 8.
105. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
106. Kogan, supra note 103, at 694 n.230.
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Court has recognized this in cases that involved whether the court can
impose a tax on an individual or a corporation under the Due Process
Clause: "The Due Process Clause requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or trans-
action it seeks to tax, and that the income attributed to the State for tax
purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing
State."' 10 7 Concerning the first part of the above, the Court has asserted:
"[T]he due process nexus analysis requires that we ask whether an indi-
vidual's connections with a State are substantial enough to legitimate the
State's exercise of power over him."'' 0 8 The Court has made similar
statements concerning due process in personal jurisdiction cases: "The
restriction on state sovereignty power described in World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp .... must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause."'
' 9
Viewed as a due process constraint on a state's ability to impose its
laws on an individual's conduct outside that state, the restrictions in
Campbell and Gore make sense. Under the Due Process Clause, the
statement that "[n]o state can legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction. . . . Each state is independent of all others in this particu-
lar" ' 0 is true because a state lacks the power to impose its law on an
individual when there is not a sufficient connection between the state and
that individual's conduct."' Accordingly, it is not that a state cannot im-
pose its policy choices on another state under the Due Process Clause,12
but that a state lacks the power to hold a defendant liable for actions in
another state based on the first state improperly applying its laws to the
defendant's actions in the second state." 3 Moreover, the federal courts
must enforce this right because a state cannot determine disinterestedly
whether it has exceeded its authority.
A state obviously should lack the power to penalize an individual
for conduct that is lawful in another state by imposing punitive damages.
A state should also not be able to calculate punitive damages based on
conduct that is unlawful in another state under the Due Process Clause.
This is true partially because, as the Court noted in Campbell, such a
determination should require the inclusion of the affected parties and the
application of the relevant state's laws.' 14 Without the joinder of all af-
fected parties, a defendant could be subject to multiple liability for the
same conduct and other parties' rights might be compromised. More
107. Quill, 504 U.S. at 306 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
108. Id. at 312.
109. Ins. Corp. oflr., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10.
110. Gore, 517 U.S. at 571 (quoting Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594).
111. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312.
112. But see Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.
113. See id. at 572-73.
114. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. at 1522 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-
22(1985)).
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fundamentally, calculating punitive damages based on conduct occurring
in other states allows a state to transfer resources belonging to citizens of
that state to its own citizens. Damages from wrongful conduct in a state
should go to the citizens of that state, not citizens in another state who
have no connection to that state. Certainly, a state has no interest-and
under the Due Process Clause, no power-to protect consumers in other
states,' 5 and it has no authority to bring damages from out-of-state mis-
conduct into its jurisdiction to enrich its residents. Finally, because states
differ on their criteria for awarding punitive damages," 16 when a court
awards punitive damages based on unlawful conduct in another state, it
has usurped the other state's authority to set the rules for giving punitive
damages, 117 and, more importantly for due process, it has imposed the
wrong rules on an individual.
One might argue that, without a state's ability to impose punitive
damages on a tortfeasor's nationwide, wrongful conduct, proper deter-
rence will not occur. However, the Constitution has bestowed the power
to regulate nationwide conduct on Congress, not on the states, under the
Commerce Clause. 1 8 It is up to Congress to act when a nationwide solu-
tion is required.
Equally important, states can reasonably differ over policies. Allow-
ing different state policies is one of the virtues of our federal system; it
permits an individual to move to a state that has laws that are most in
accord with his or her views. As Professor Barry Friedman has written:
"[Federalism enhances our lives by preserving and creating diver-
sity."" 9 Professor Laycock has similarly observed: "Territorial bounda-
115. Cf Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire power of
supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its
own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State."); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
644 (1982) ("While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders."). But see Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritori-
alit and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 891-96 (2002)
(arguing that Bigelow is limited "to mean that the Home State's police powers do not extend to the
extraterritorial regulation of matters that the Constitution prohibits Home States from banning").
116. As Margaret Meriwether Cordray has observed:
Laws regulating the various aspects of punitive damages vary dramatically from state to
state. States employ different substantive tests for finding a defendant liable for punitive
damages, different standards of proof that must be met, and different procedures for de-
termining whether to grant a punitive award. Some states have even prohibited punitive
damages almost entirely, and others have placed relatively strict caps on the amount that
may be awarded.
Margaret Meriwether Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive
Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 307 (1999).
117. Gore, 517 U.S. at 572.
118. Seeid. at571.
119. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 402 (1997); see also United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In this circumstance, the
theory and utility of our [vertical] federalism are revealed, for the States may perform their role as
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from
clear."); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
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ries between states and their law support the role of law as enforcer of
strongly held norms."'' 20 For example, Vermont has recently given gay
and lesbian couples that right to enter into domestic partnerships,' 2'
while no other state offers recognition to such relationships. Thus, gay
and lesbian couples who want to enter into domestic partnerships can
move to Vermont. Likewise, some individuals might want the freedom to
own guns, while others might want the protection of gun control laws.
Similarly, some states might want strong medical malpractice laws,
while other states might feel that some relief from high malpractice
awards improves healthcare by encouraging the best doctors to practice
in the state. Even when states agree on policies, they can disagree on
how those policies should be enforced. 122 For example, one jurisdiction
might want to control guns through prohibition; another through registra-
tion.
The other half of the Court's due process evaluation of punitive
damages awards-fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrariness-is
correct. It is the essence of due process that a person receive notice of
what conduct is forbidden and the penalty for violations so that he can
order his life and activities.123  As Justice Scalia has observed,
"[r]udimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have
the means of knowing what it prescribes."' 124 In most punitive damages
cases, there are few guidelines to restrict juries, and, thus, a defendant
has little warning of the extent of the damages.125 For example, as noted
above, when BMW's policy was first challenged in Gore, there did not
appear to be any judicial decision in Alabama or any state that suggested
that the use of the policy might subject BMW to severe punishment.
26
of the country."); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judi-
cial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 150 (2001). Professors Baker and Young similarly note: "[S]tate-by-
state diversity generally will allow government to accommodate the preferences of a greater propor-
tion of the electorate, as long as those preferences are unequally distributed geographically." Id.
They add that "[gliven the unpredictability of national elections over the long term, the rational and
risk-averse position, even for those who believe there are 'right answers' to important questions of
social policy, is to favor states' rights." Id. at 153; see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1503-04 (1987) ("The liberty that is
protected by federalism is not the liberty of the apodictic solution, but the liberty that comes from
diversity coupled with mobility.") [hereinafter McConnell, The Founders' Design].
120. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 318 (1992).
121. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2003).
122. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("While it is doubtful that any State, or
indeed any reasonable person, would argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on
school premises, considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal.").
123. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-40 (2d ed. 1969); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
124. Scalia, supra note 123, at 1179.
125. Gore, 517 U.S. at 588 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The standards the Alabama courts applied
here are vague and open ended to the point where they risk arbitrary results.... This is because the
standards, as the Alabama Supreme Court authoritatively interpreted them here, provided no signifi-
cant constraints or protection against arbitrary results.").
126. Id. at 584.
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The fair warning requirement also helps assure that similarly situated
persons will be treated similarly. 27 As Justice Jackson stated, "there is
no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally."'
28
At first glance, this second part of the due process inquiry regarding
punitive damages seems to have little to do with horizontal federalism.
However, fair warning and the avoidance of arbitrariness relate to hori-
zontal federalism. As noted above, a state should not impose liability on
an individual without fair warning.129 When a state calculates punitive
damages based on conduct that is lawful in another state, the defendant
has not been given fair warning of potential liability. This is also true
when a court imposes punitive damages for unlawful conduct in another
state when the compensatory damages involve only conduct that oc-
curred in the forum state. In such circumstances, a defendant is subject to
the whim of the court, and it cannot order its conduct with any cer-
tainty. 130
Moreover, arbitrary punitive damages awards-awards that exceed
a state's need to protect its interests and its citizens' interests-allows a
state to impose its views on other states and to reap benefits for its citi-
zens beyond those to which they are entitled. Similarly, such awards
place unfair burdens on out-of-state defendants.' 3' Finally, such awards
force other states to adopt similarly aggressive schemes in "a race to the
bottom."
The three-part test effectively evaluates the above concerns, includ-
ing those of horizontal federalism. First, evaluating the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant's conduct insures that a state is not reaping
damages that belong to other states and that it is not exploiting out-of-
state defendants for its unjustified benefit. This factor prevents punitive
damages from being based on out-of-state conduct, and it ensures that the
punishment "reflect[s] 'the enormity of [the] offense."'1 32 Second, con-
sidering the ratio between the punitive damages and the compensatory
damages serves a similar function. A too great ratio indicates that a state
is not just trying to further its legitimate interest but instead is attempting
to exploit benefits that belong to other states. Finally, it should be obvi-
ous that punitive damages in a civil suit should not exceed legislatively
mandated civil and criminal penalties.
127. Id. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
128. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
129. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574.
130. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
131. Even unpopular defendants, such as corporations, deserve to be treated in a fair and con-
stitutional manner.
132. Gore, 517 U.S. at 575 (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363,371 (1851)).
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The Rehnquist Court has not extended its due process limits on pu-
nitive damages to other areas of the law, even areas where one might
argue that one state is imposing its policy on other states. 133 From this,
one can conclude that the Court's focus is on limiting the size of punitive
damages, not horizontal federalism. Thus, Campbell and Gore are
anomalies in horizontal federalism, with their results dictated by a pur-
pose other than horizontal federalism. As discussed in more detail below,
this author rejects such inconsistency in constitutional adjudication. If
due process limits are justifiable in punitive damages cases, they are jus-
tifiable in other cases in which a state has unreasonably extended its laws
beyond its borders to burden individuals.
II. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT LIMITS ON HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
Theoretically, the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects a state's
sovereignty by requiring other states to respect its laws and judgments.
134
However, the Rehnquist Court has given little content to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause concerning choice of law, and it has created confusing
exceptions to the full faith and credit due judgments.
A. The Rehnquist Court's Analysis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause and Choice of Law
In Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt,135 the Court held that Nevada
could refuse to extend full faith and credit to California's sovereign im-
munity statute in a case involving alleged tortious acts in Nevada by the
California Franchise Tax Board (CFrB).13 6 Hyatt had filed a part-year
resident income tax form with California for 1991, claiming that he had
ceased to be a California resident on October 1, 1991, shortly before he
received licensing fees for patents. 137 The CFTB performed an audit, and
it determined that Hyatt was a California resident until April 3, 1992.138
The CFTB issued notices of proposed assessments for income taxes for
1991 and 1992, and it imposed substantial penalties.
139
Hyatt filed an administrative protest in California and brought suit
in Nevada state court against the CFTB claiming invasion of privacy,
outrageous conduct, abuse of process, fraud, and negligent misrepresen-
tation. 140 The CFTB filed motions for summary judgment and, in thealternative, for dismissal in the Nevada case for lack of subject matter
133. See infra Part IV.C.1 for a detailed discussion for other areas in which the Court should
apply greater due process constraints.
134. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
135. 123 S. Ct. 1683 (2003).




140. Id- at 16895-86
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jurisdiction, arguing that sovereign immunity, full faith and credit, choice
of law, comity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies required
Nevada to apply California's sovereign immunity statute. 14' The trial
court denied the motion, and Hyatt filed a writ of mandamus with the
Nevada Supreme Court. 42 The Nevada Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion and ordered the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the
CFTB. 143
On rehearing, however, the Nevada Supreme Court granted the peti-
tion in part and denied it in part, holding that the district court lacked
jurisdiction over the negligence claim under comity, 44 but that the inten-
tional tort claims could be tried.' 45 The court noted that, while Nevada
had not conferred immunity on its state agencies for intentional torts
committed within the scope of employment, California had. 146 The court
held that giving California immunity for intentional torts contravened
Nevada public policy because Nevada does not afford such immunity
and Nevada has an interest in protecting its citizens from intentional torts
committed by sister state governmental employees. 147 Thus, according to
the court, Nevada's policy in protecting its citizens outweighed Califor-
nia's policy conferring sovereign immunity on its state taxation
agency. 148
The United States Supreme Court evaluated the case under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, which provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State."'' 49 The Court emphasized that "[w]hereas the
full faith and credit command 'is exacting' with respect to '[a] final
judgment . . . rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the
subject matter and persons governed by the judgment,'. . . it is less de-
manding with respect to choice of laws."' 150 The Court noted that "[w]e
have held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel 'a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a
141. Id. at 1686. California's sovereign immunity statute reads:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by:
(a) Instituting any judicial or administrative proceeding or action for or incidental to the
assessment or collection of a tax.
(b) An act or omission in the interpretation or application of any law relating to a tax.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 860.2 (West 1995).
142. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1686.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1686-87 (stating that comity is "an accommodation policy, under which the courts
of one state voluntarily give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state out of deference
and respect, to promote harmonious interstate relations ...." (internal quotations omitted)).
145. Id. at 1686.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1687 ("With respect to the intentional torts, however, the court held that 'affording
[CFTB] statutory authority ... does contravene Nevada's policies and interests in this case."' (cita-
tion omitted)).
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
150. Id. (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)).
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subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate." 5''  The
Court then found that Nevada was competent to legislate with respect to
intentional torts occurring within its borders.15 2 Next, the Court reaf-
firmed the standard that earlier courts had applied to choice of law cases,
specifically: "'[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitu-
tionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.""053 The
Court felt that Nevada had significant contacts to employ its law because
the alleged injury and some of the conduct that caused that alleged injury
occurred in Nevada. 1
54
The CFTB had urged the Court "to adopt a 'new rule' mandating
that a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily
recaptured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would
'interfer[e] with a State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsi-
bilities."'"55 The Court declined to adopt this rule. 156 It observed that it
had considered the question of whether full faith and credit requires the
courts of one state to recognize the sovereign immunity of another state
in Nevada v. Hall.157 In that case, a Nevada employee had been involved
in an automobile accident in California, and California had refused to
select a Nevada statute that capped damages against Nevada. 158 The
Court affirmed, holding that the Constitution does not confer sovereign
immunity on a state when sued in the courts of another state. 159 Hyatt had
not asked the Court to reexamine this ruling.16°
The Court then concentrated on the second aspect of Hall, that a
state does not have to respect another state's sovereign immunity when it
would violate the first state's legitimate public policy.' 6' The Court had
stated in a footnote in Hall:
California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case poses no substan-
tial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism.
151. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988)).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985)).
154. Id. at 1688.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1688-89 ("[A]cknowledging this shift, CFTB contends that this case demonstrates
the need for a new rule under the Full Faith and Credit Clause .... We disagree.").
157. Id. at 1689 (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
158. Hall, 440 U.S. at 411-12.
159. Id. at 426-27.
160. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689. The Court declined the invitation of the amici states to do so. Id.
I believe the petitioner wrongly argued the case when it refused one of the justice's invitation to ask
the Court to overrule Hall. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 02-42),
available in 2003 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 12, at *2-3 (Feb. 24, 2003). In his dissent in Hall, then-
Justice Rehnquist had made a sovereign immunity argument very similar to the one the Court later
adopted in Alden and its progeny. Compare Hall, 440 U.S. at 432-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), with
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
161. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689.
2003]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Suits involving traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could
hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign
responsibilities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider
whether different state policies, either of California or of Nevada,
might require a different analysis or a different result.
162
The Court refused to adopt the CFTB's proposed rule primarily be-
cause of its past experience in balancing interests under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.' 6 The Court observed that it had abandoned a balanc-
ing of interests approach to conflict of laws under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause because of the lack of guiding standards.' 64 Instead, the
Court declared that "'it is frequently the case under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of one State
or the contrary law of another.""
65
The Court thought that, since a suit against a state in another state's
court implicates the power of both sovereigns, "the question of which
sovereign interest should be deemed more weighty is not one that can be
easily answered."' 66 The Court also noted that in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority'67 it had rejected a rule of state sovereign
immunity from federal regulation depending on whether the function was
"integral" or "traditional" on the ground that the rule was unsound and
unworkable. 68 The Court also believed that there was not a significant
distinction between Nevada's interest in tort claims arising out of its em-
ployee's automobile accident at issue in Hall, and California's interest in
tort claims arising out of its tax collection agency's audit in the instant
case. 169 The Court asserted that "[t]o the extent CFTB complains of the
burdens and expense of out-of-state litigation, and the diversion of state
resources away from the performance of important state functions, those
burdens do not distinguish this case from any other out-of-state lawsuit
against California or one of its agencies."
'170
The Court observed:
States' sovereignty interests are not foreign to the full faith and
credit command. But we are not presented here with a case in which
a State has exhibited a policy of hostility to the public Acts of a sister
State. The Nevada Supreme Court sensitively applied principles of
comity with a healthy regard for California's sovereign status, relying
162. Hall, 440 U.S. at 424 n.24.
163. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689.
164. Id. at 1688 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (plurality
opinion)).
165. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 727).
166. Id. at 1689.
167. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
168. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689 (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546-47).




on the contours of Nevada's own sovereign immunity from suit as a
benchmark for its analysis. 7 '
The Court concluded that "[w]ithout a rudder to steer us, we decline
to embark on the constitutional course of balancing coordinate States'
competing sovereign interests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause."'
172
2. Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit for Judgments.
In addition to giving the Full Faith and Credit Clause little content
in Hyatt, the Court in Baker v. General Motors Corp. created an excep-
tion to full faith and credit for judgments. 173 The majority stated the issue
as "the authority of one State's court to order that a witness' testimony
shall not be heard in any court of the United States.' 74
In a Michigan lawsuit, which involved a wrongful discharge claim
by a "whistle blower," GM paid Ronald Elwell, a former GM employee,
an undisclosed sum of money for which the parties entered into a perma-
nent injunction. 75 The injunction prohibited Elwell from "testifying,
without the prior written consent of [GM] .... as ... a witness of any
kind ... in any litigation already filed, or to be filed in the future, involv-
ing [GM] as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or designer .... GM
also agreed that if Elwell were compelled to testify by a court, such tes-
timony would not violate the injunction. 77 Thereafter, in a Missouri law-
suit (Baker), the plaintiffs, who were not parties to the Michigan lawsuit,
subpoenaed Elwell to testify in a product liability action.1 78 The Court
held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not preclude Elwell's tes-
timony before the Missouri court. 1
79
The Court stated that a final judgment, rendered with proper juris-
diction, "qualifies for recognition throughout the land."' 80 The Court also
noted that there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit
due judgments.' 8' Moreover, the Court felt that full faith and credit ap-
plies to equity judgments (e.g., injunctions), as well as to money judg-
ments.182 However, the Court thought that full faith and credit does not
require states to "adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,
171. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
172. Id.
173. Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
174. Id. at 225-26.
175. Id. at 227.




180. Id. at 233.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 234.
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manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments." 183 The Court noted
that the preclusive effects of a judgment are different from the enforce-
ment measures for that judgment in that the latter are under the control of
the enforcing forum law.' 84 The Court noted:
Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied en-
forcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an of-
ficial act within the exclusive province of that other State or inter-
fered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.
Thus, a sister State's decree concerning land ownership in another
State has been held ineffective to transfer title .... 185
Similarly, antisuit injunctions do not control a second state court's ac-
tions concerning litigation in the second court.'
86
Concerning the current suit, the Court declared:
Michigan's judgment, however, cannot reach beyond the Elwell-
GM controversy to control proceedings against GM brought in other
States, by other parties, asserting claims the merits of which Michi-
gan has not considered. Michigan has no power over those parties,
and no basis for commanding them to become intervenors in the El-
well-GM dispute. Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to con-
trol courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by
strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves
what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant
and admissible in their search for the truth.1
8 7
The Court stated, that while the Michigan injunction could prevent El-
well from volunteering to testify, it could not determine evidentiary is-
sues in another state's courts. 188 The Court concluded by noting that
"Michigan has no authority to shield a witness from another jurisdic-
tion's subpoena power in a case involving persons and causes outside
Michigan's governance .... [A] Michigan decree cannot command obe-
dience elsewhere on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority to re-
solve."1
89
B. Evaluation of the Rehnquist Court's Analysis of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause
In Hyatt, the Court gave little meaning to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause,' 90 and, in Baker, the Court created a confusing exception to the
183. Id. at 235.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 236.
187. Id. at 238 (internal citation omitted).
188. Id. at 239.
189. Id. at 240-41.
190. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687-90.
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full faith and credit rule for judgments.' 91 While this author agrees with
the outcomes in both cases for other reasons, the Court has reaffirmed
questionable precedent and gone beyond what was necessary to decide
both cases.
1. Evaluation of Full Faith and Credit Constraints on Choice of
Law in Hyatt
Hyatt continued the Court's questionable refusal to give the Full
Faith and Credit Clause any content in relation to choice of law. 192 This
approach dates back to the New Deal era when the Court generally re-
jected constraints on governmental regulation, adopting instead a phi-
losophy of judicial restraint. 193 While most writers have stressed the New
Deal Court's restraint in the areas of substantive due process, federalism,
and delegation, it also occurred in connection with the full faith and
credit clause.194 As the Court had previously done in other areas of law,
the Court in Hyatt took a hands-off approach to choice of law and let the
state decide when its law should apply.
95
As noted above, the Court restated that it gives less full faith and
credit to a state's laws than it does to judgments. 96 The problem with
this declaration is that there is nothing in the Constitution that supports
this distinction. 197 The Full Faith and Credit Clause "shall" apply to
"public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings," without exception. 98
Several judges and authors, including the present author, have recently
advocated that all clauses of the Constitution should be given their full
content. 99 For example, Chief Judge Wilkinson has asserted:
191. Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
192. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 70-71 (criticizing the Court's
treatment of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in connection with choice of law).
193. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 155, 215-16 (1988).
194. See, e.g., FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 16-20.
195. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1689-90.
196. Id. at 1687; see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 290-95 (arguing that there is no question
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to all types of state law, including statutes, case law,
and judgments).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (making no distinction for judgments).
198. Id.
199. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 894-95 (4th Cir.
1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring) (finding it "patently inconsistent" for a court to place great
weight on one constitutional provision and little to no weight on others), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL
STRUCTURE 6-7 (1995) [hereinafter REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE]; Baker & Young, supra note
119, at 77-78 ("The fact is that for much of the last century, the Supreme Court, with widespread
academic support, has behaved as if 'constitutional provisions are like the animals in George Or-
well's barnyard: some are considerably more equal than others."' (quoting Sanford Levinson &
Ernest A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 944
(2001))); Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels, supra note 15, at 486-94 (discussing the inconsistent
enforcement of constitutional provisions associated with "new judicial activism"); Scott Fruehwald,
The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A Call for Detachment in the
Constitutional Adjudication of Federalism, 53 MERCER L. REV. 811, 825-26 (2002) [hereinafter
Fruehwald, The New Federalism]; Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
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[I]t is hard to understand how one can argue for giving capacious
meanings to some constitutional provisions while reading others out
of the document entirely.. . . It seems patently inconsistent to argue
for a Due Process Clause that means a great deal and a Commerce
Clause that means nothing. How one clause can be robust and the
other anemic is a mystery when both clauses, after all, are part of ourConstitution. 200
Similarly, as Martin Redish has pointed out, "by choosing not to en-
force a constitutional limitation on the majoritarian branches because of
disagreement with its social or political purpose or impact, the courts are
engaging in undue judicial activism., 20 1 Likewise, Professor Baker and
Professor Young have observed that "the Constitution does not come
with 'do not enforce' labels attached to some of its provisions. 202 This
principle of enforcement of all constitutional provisions should be ap-
plied to give the Full Faith and Credit Clause its full content with all pos-
sible applications, judgments, statutes, and case law.203
Hyatt has also continued the Court's questionable practice of refus-
ing to balance interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause or to make
some comparable determination concerning which state has the closest
connection to the case.204 It is understandable that when two states' inter-
ests are nearly equal a court should not balance interests because it is
difficult to make such a determination and both states have a significant
stake in applying their laws. However, when one state's interest is sig-
nificantly stronger than the other state's interest, the Court can and, as
will be argued below, should balance interests or undertake a similar
evaluation based on connections.0 5 The Court frequently makes fine
distinctions such as deciding whether Congress has acted properly under
its commerce clause powers and other structural clauses.20 6 There is no
and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259, 1304-05 (2001) (discussing judicial con-
struction of the privileges and immunities clause); Laycock, supra note 120, at 267 ("[Wle should
take the whole Constitution seriously. We cannot legitimately pick and choose the clauses we want
enforced."); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 154-59, 227-32 (2002) (arguing that the courts should
give effect to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
200. Brzonkala, 169 F.3d at 894-95 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
201. REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 164.
202. Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 100.
203. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 290 (arguing that "[als a simple matter of constitutional
text, the Clause must have the same meaning with respect to rules of law [as it does to judgments]").
204. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687-88.
205. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (making a
similar argument in connection with vertical federalism that "[a]lthough it is the obligation of all
officers of the Government to respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a
part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit
inability to intervene when one or the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far" (in-
temal citations omitted)); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (discussing the
intricacies and balance of sovereignty between federal and state power).
206. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Of the various structural elements in the Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances,
judicial review, and federalism, only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty
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reason why the Court cannot do so for the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
As Justice Kennedy has noted, "we are often called upon to resolve ques-
tions of constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application
of bright and clear lines., 20 7 Also, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
much clearer than other provisions the Court has used to create rights,
such as using the liberty part of the Due Process Clause to create a right
of privacy.20 Moreover, the federal courts need to make the determina-
tion of whether a state has exceeded its authority under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause because, as was mentioned earlier in connection with due
process determinations, a state cannot make a disinterested evaluation
concerning whether it has exceeded its authority. Finally, as will be
shown below, this refusal to balance interests was unnecessary because
Nevada had at least an equal, and maybe a greater, interest than Califor-
nia in applying its law to the controversy in Hyatt.
The Court also reaffirmed the questionable standard for evaluating a
state's choice of law from earlier cases, "'[flor a State's substantive law
to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair. ' ' '209 Because the Court has interpreted "significant con-
tact" to apply to almost anything, a state can (and usually does) apply its
law to a case even when it has a tenuous connection to that matter. For
example, in Allstate, the first case that stated this rule, the Court held that
Minnesota could apply its law to the question of whether uninsured mo-
torist coverage under three automobile insurance policies could be
"stacked"-all three policies paid off to their limits, rather than limiting
recovery to the maximum under one policy. 210 The motorcycle accident
had occurred in Wisconsin, the policy was delivered in Wisconsin, and
all relevant parties lived in Wisconsin at the time of the accident. 2" The
connections with Minnesota were: (1) the decedent worked in Minnesota
and commuted from Wisconsin to Minnesota; (2) Allstate did business in
Minnesota; and (3) the widow moved to Wisconsin after the accident but
before the litigation.2 1 The connections with Minnesota were so weak
respecting the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant
role in maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers. Although the resolution of specific
cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution workable standards to assist in
preserving separation of powers and checks and balances.").
207. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Baker & Young, supra note
119, at 93-94 ("[T]he courts have a responsibility to exercise 'reasoned judgment' even when bright-
line rules are not available to enforce particular constitutional principles ...." (quoting Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring))).
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; id. amend. XIV; see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 334
(stating that "[tihe Court must make choices with respect to details, but the choices are guided by
concrete principles set forth in the Constitution and the federal structure").
209. Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687 (quoting Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 818).
210. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 306-07, 319-20 (1981) (plurality opinion).
211. Hague, 449 U.S. at 306.
212. Id. at 313-14, 317-19.
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that it should not have been able to apply its law to the controversy under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. First, all significant connections-the
place of the accident, the place of contracting and delivery, and the par-
ties' domiciles at the time of the accident-were with Wisconsin.2 13 Sec-
ond, the fact that the decedent worked in Minnesota is irrelevant to an
accident that occurred in another state and an insurance policy that was
entered into in that other state. Third, that Allstate did business in Minne-
sota is irrelevant; a state cannot apply its law to a party doing business in
a state when that controversy has no connection to that state. Finally, the
fact that a widow moved to another state after an occurrence should not
allow that state to apply its law to a case when it has no other connection
to the matter. With the irrelevant connections to Minnesota and the
strong connections to Wisconsin, the Court in Allstate should have held
that Minnesota adopting its law violated the Full Faith and Credit
Clause-that Minnesota had given no credit to Wisconsin law without
any justification.21 4 However, the Court failed to do so and Hyatt has
exacerbated the mistake by adhering to the Allstate standard.215
Despite the Court's questionable analytical framework, Hyatt's re-
sult was correct; Nevada should not have been forced to apply Califor-
nia's sovereign immunity statute in its courts when one of its citizens has
been injured.216 First, the Court properly rejected the Franchise Tax
Board's argument that the Court should adopt a new rule "mandating that
a state court extend full faith and credit to a sister State's statutorily re-
captured sovereign immunity from suit when a refusal to do so would
interfere with a State's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign responsibili-
ties., 21 7 There is nothing in the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to
support such a narrow rule.218 Rather, courts should evaluate full faith
and credit on a case-by-case basis, looking carefully at the laws that are
vying for application. As the Court pointed out, it is hard to say that one
state's interest in protecting its ability to tax with sovereign immunity is
any more important than another state's interest in protecting its citi-
zens.
2 19
The main reason that Hyatt came to the correct conclusion was that
Nevada had as strong an interest in applying its law to the case as Cali-
fornia did and, perhaps, even a stronger interest. 220 The conduct com-
213. Id. at 306.
214. One might argue that the Allstate outcome was the best decision from a normative view-
point that an insured who had paid premiums on three policies received the full benefits of those
policies. However, ignoring the Constitution's structural provisions to achieve a socially advanta-
geous outcome in one case is dangerous because it may lead to unprincipled judging in other areas.
215. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687-88; Hague, 449 U.S. at 320.
216. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1688-89.
217. Id. at 1688 (internal quotations omitted).
218. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
219. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1690.




plained of occurred in Nevada.22' Obviously, Nevada should be able to
establish whether conduct occurring within its borders constitutes tor-
tious conduct for which a plaintiff can recover damages. Less obvious,
but equally correct, a state should be able to determine when a govern-
ment is immune for acts committed within its borders. California should
not be able to extend its sovereign immunity statute to encompass con-
duct occurring outside California.22 2 If the case had involved tortious
conduct occurring in California sued upon in a Nevada court, Nevada
should enforce the California sovereign immunity, even if the case in-
volved a Nevada citizen, because the tort occurred in California and a
state (here, Nevada) should not be able to protect its citizens from liabil-
ity for acts occurring outside its borders when that liability does not vio-
late the Constitution.2 3 But this case did not involve California conduct;
it involved Nevada conduct.224 Accordingly, the Court could have made
its decision without differentiating between law and judgments, refusing
to balance interests under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, or reaffirming
Allstate's questionable rule.
The Court could have dealt with the concerns it voiced in balancing
state interests but still could have given the Full Faith and Credit Clause
content if it had adopted a rule for the full faith and credit evaluation of
state choice of law where a state's choice of law violates the Full Faith
and Credit Clause when another state has a significantly closer connec-
tion to the matter. 225 This rule does not require careful evaluation of state
interests when they are virtually the same, but only when one state's
connection to a case is significantly closer than another state's connec-
tion. Thus, a state can protect its interests and still give full faith and
credit to other states' laws.
2. Evaluation of the Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit for Judg-
ments in Baker
In Baker, the majority limited the ability of one state's courts to
control litigation in another state's courts through a confusing exception
to the full faith and credit rule for judgments.226 As Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Baker pointed out, the full faith and credit analysis in that
221. See id. at 1685-86.
222. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975); see also Cordray, supra note 116, at
293 ("[R]espect for the sovereignty of each individual state demands that all states limit the reach of
their laws and the exercise of their authority to govern within their own boundaries.").
223. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824 ("A State does not acquire power or supervision over the
internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its own citizens may be
affected when they travel to that State.").
224. See Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1685-86.
225. This author has previously suggested this standard for the full faith and credit (and due
process) evaluation of state choice of law. See, e.g., FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101,
at 77. The Multistate Tax Commission referred to this standard in its amicus brief in Hyatt. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae Multistate Tax Commission at 12 n.20, Hyatt 123 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 02-42).
226. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
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case was unnecessary and unfortunate because the matter could have
been settled by establishing the preclusive effect of the Michigan judg-
ment.227 After examining Michigan law, Justice Kennedy concluded:
"The simple fact is that the Bakers were not parties to the Michigan pro-
ceedings, and nothing indicates Michigan would make the novel asser-
tion that its earlier injunction binds the Bakers or any other party not then
before it or subject to its jurisdiction. 228 He noted that the Michigan
Supreme Court had "twice rejected arguments that injunctions have pre-
clusive effect in later litigation" based in part on the fact that the later
litigation involved new parties.229
In addition, as Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence, no execu-
tion may issue on a judgment in a second state until the enforcing party
brings a new suit in the enforcing state.230 Although this was not done in
Baker, the injunction was not deemed unenforceable on this ground
alone.23
The majority opinion allows for the possibility of two significant
and confusing exceptions to the rule that a state must recognize the
judgments of another state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: (1) a
court may "decline to enforce those judgments purporting to accomplish
an official act within the exclusive province of [a sister] State" and (2)
full faith and credit does not apply to "injunctions interfering with litiga-
tion over which the ordering State had no authority., 232 Concerning the
first exception, the Supreme Court acknowledged other cases that upheld
court orders requiring the conveyance of property in other states.233 The
Court had not used the second exception before Baker.234 As Justice
Kennedy argued, such "exceptions to full faith and credit have a potential
for disrupting judgments, and this ought to give us considerable
pause. 235
The question of whether one state must give full faith and credit to
the injunctions of another state's courts in general is unsettled.236 While
227. See id. at 243, 251 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause 'did not make the
judgments of other States domestic judgments to all intents and purposes, but only gave a general
validity, faith, and credit to them, as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judgments without
a new suit in the tribunals of other States."' (quoting Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457,
462-63 (1873))); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (noting that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause "does not make a sister-State judgment a judgment in another State").
231. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 237-41.
232. Id. at 243 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
233. Id. at 244 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See generally Katherine C. Pearson, Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and
Consent Judgments: The Analytical Challenge, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 419 (1999) (discussing state
court recognition of consent judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Polly J. Price, Full
Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747 (1998) (discussing the authority of
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237 hanothe Court has said that the rule for judgments is exacting, this has not
always been true in practice. First, the Supreme Court has not adjudi-
cated all the questions that might arise in connection with the enforce-
ment of judgments, especially equity judgments. As Professor Polly J.
Price has observed, the "expansive use of equitable remedies creates
significant potential for interstate conflict. ''238 Second, the Supreme
Court has not always given full faith and credit to judgments, including
Baker,239 a consent decree that involved issue preclusion against the fed-
eral government, 24 and a case involving successive worker's compensa-
tion awards.24' Justice Stone has noted:
As this Court has often recognized, there are many judgments which
need not be given the same force and effect abroad which they have
at home, and there are some, though valid in the state where ren-
dered, to which the full faith and credit clause gives no force else-
where. In the assertion of rights, defined by a judgment of one state,
within the territory of another, there is often an inescapable conflict
of interest of the two states, and there comes a point beyond which
the imposition of the will of one state beyond its own borders in-
volves a forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic interest
of the other.
242
Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be
recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recognition or en-
forcement is not required by the national policy of full faith and
credit because it would involve an improper interference with impor-
tant interests of the sister State.
243
Third, giving exacting full faith and credit to all judgments would violate
the Due Process Clause in certain instances, such as when the judgment
binds persons who were not parties to the original action.244 Thus, instead
of stating that the rule for full faith and credit is exacting and then creat-
state courts to assert equitable remedies that extend beyond state and jurisdictional boundaries);
Stewart E. Sterk, The Muddy Boundaries Between Res Judicata and Full Faith and Credit, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 47 (2001) (discussing the state preclusion doctrine extending beyond state
and jurisdictional boundaries in light of the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Chris Heikaus Weaver,
Binding the World: Full Faith & Credit of State Court Antisuit Injunctions, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
993 (2003) (discussing unsettled question of preclusive effect of state court antisuit injunctions
across state lines).
237. See, e.g., Hyatt, 123 S. Ct. at 1687; Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. But see Yarborough v. Yar-
borough, 290 U.S. 202, 214 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) (discussing how the "broad language [of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause] has never been applied without limitations").
238. Price, supra note 236, at 748.
239. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 240-41.
240. See United States v. Int'l Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953).
241. See Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980).
242. Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 214-15 (Stone, J., dissenting).
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971).
244. The Bakers presented a similar argument to the Supreme Court. See Petitioner's Brief at
12-18, Baker, 522 U.S. 222 (No. 96-653).
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ing confusing exceptions, it might be better to re-examine when a state's
equity judgments should be accorded full faith and credit.
The best way to approach this issue is by asking questions of hori-
zontal federalism. In issuing the injunction, has the court exceeded its
territorial authority? Does the underlying law have proper extraterritorial
effect or does enforcing the injunction involve enforcing another state's
laws? Has the court enjoined an action that is legal in another state? Does
a court in one state have the power to bind parties in another state that
were not parties in the original action? Is a court in one state dictating the
procedures of another state's courts? Does the injunction control activi-
ties in another state?
These questions can be combined into one inquiry: Does one state
have a significantly closer connection to the controversy than the other
state? 45 As this author argued above, acts and judgments should be given
the same full faith and credit, and a state should give another state's laws
full faith and credit when the other state has a significantly closer con-
nection to the controversy. The same rule can be applied to judgments.246
This will not change the long-standing rule for money judgments-when
a money judgment has been properly rendered, the matter is settled, and
the rendering state has the closest connection to the controversy.247 On
245. The "significantly" requirement allows for the possibility that two states may have close
connections to the controversy. In such an instance, the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not impli-
cated, unless the forum chooses its law because it is state law.
246. One might wonder what effect the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000),
has on the enforcement of judgments. The statute states:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territo-
ries and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.
Id. This statute obviously extends full faith and credit requirements to federal courts, territories, and
possessions. Whether greater substantive full faith and credit is required than under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause is unclear. If taken literally, the statute would require a state to give the laws or
"acts" of another state the same credit in its courts as it has in its own courts. This might mean that
the other state's law would trump the forum state's law. If taken less literally, the statute would not
allow the choice of law standard in Allstate discussed above. Thus, one can conclude that the modem
court does not seem to give the statute any substantive effect for choice of law beyond that required
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The statute's effect on judgments is also unclear based on recent Supreme Court cases. Al-
though the majority opinions of Baker and Thomas mention the statute, the opinions do not give the
statute any different substantive effect than the constitutional clause. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 231-32;
Thomas, 448 U.S. at 264 n. 1. As Professor Brilmayer has noted, the "apparently clear command" of
the statute does not seem to have prevented courts from ignoring it on occasion. LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 307 (1995).
The real problem, of course, is the typical one of statutory analysis-that when Congress first
enacted the statute it probably did not consider its effect on equity judgments. For purposes of this
Article, I will assume that the full faith and credit statute has the same effect on equity judgments as
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
247. Professor Sterk has argued that when a money judgment is involved, enforcing other
states' judgments "imposes only weak limits on the sovereign power of a state to control behavior
within its borders" because it involves past conduct. Sterk, supra note 236, at 49. In addition, Profes-
sor Brilmayer has noted: "Finality dictates that the losing party to a dispute not be able to reopen a
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the other hand, when an equity judgment has been rendered, on-going
conduct is involved, and, if the injunction involves conduct in the enforc-
ing state, the enforcing state should have to give the judgment full faith
and credit only if the rendering state has a significantly closer connection
to the conduct. 48 When a forum refuses to recognize another state's in-
junction because the forum has the closest connection to the controversy,
it is not interfering with the rendering state's sovereignty because the
state that is refusing to enforce the judgment is regulating conduct within
its sovereignty.
Asking the above questions and applying the significantly closer
connection standard, Baker is an easy case, even if a Michigan court
would have enforced the injunction. First, enforcing the injunction would
bind persons who were not parties to the Michigan litigation. If this were
a simple contract, it would not be enforceable against third parties.
249
Second, Michigan cannot dictate to Missouri its rules of evidence. Third,
the Michigan injunction, if applied, would control activities in Missouri.
As Professor Pearson has observed, "[t]he ElwelI/GM consent judgment
represents a distinct instance in which at least one party intended to af-
fect the important interests of nonparties across the nation ... .250 It
would allow a Michigan lawsuit to silence a whistle blower in Missouri,
as well as the rest of the world. Finally, Missouri has a significantly
closer connection to the questions of whether evidence is admissible and
whether it will enforce a confidentiality agreement in Missouri courts
than does Michigan. Thus, while Michigan does have an interest in en-
forcing its judgments, that interest does not extend into Missouri to con-
trol litigation involving persons not parties to the original action. In
short, Michigan cannot bind the world.
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS ON HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM
A. Introduction
The principal method of regulating horizontal federalism since the
1940s has been through the dormant commerce clause.
25' This limitation
decision without good reason." BRILMAYER, supra note 246, at 298. This principle of finality does
not apply to future conduct. Id. at 299.
248. Professor Sterk has argued that judgments should not be enforceable under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause when they involve post-judgment behavior. Sterk, supra note 236, at 107. Judg-
ments, in particular money judgments, usually adjudicate past behavior. Id. at 49. An injunction
judgment, because it controls future behavior, can control a sovereign's ability to regulate activity
within its territory. Id. at 50. Thus, an injunction judgment is like a sister-state act, to which the
courts traditionally give less full faith and credit. Id.
249. See Pearson, supra note 236, at 420 (noting that consent judgments, like the one involved
in Baker, "are often little more than the parties' contracts, rubber-stamped by the court").
250. Id. at 451.
251. The Commerce Clause reads, "[tihe Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "It is long established that,
while a literal reading evinces a grant of power to Congress, the Commerce Clause also directly
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determines "[t]he scope of permissible state regulation in the absence of
congressional action. 252 It prevents a state from imposing economic
protections based on the concept that the Commerce Clause was intended
to create free trade among the states and eliminate trade barriers. 3 For
example, the Court has used the dormant commerce clause to strike
down a state law limiting the length of trains that pass through a state as
a part of interstate commerce,254 a state safety regulation that required the
use of contour mud flaps on interstate trucks within the state,255 a state
regulation that set minimum milk prices that out-of-state dealers had to
256pay to producers, an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma electric
plants to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten-percent Okla-
homa-mined coal,257 and a local ordinance that required all solid waste
generated within the city to pass through that city's new treatment cen-
ter.258
Healy v. The Beer Institute 259 and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
2 60
show how the Rehnquist Court has regulated horizontal federalism
through the dormant commerce clause. The Court in Healy held that a
limits the power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce." Wyoming v. Oklahoma,
502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992). Several judges and authors, however, have argued that the dormant com-
merce clause is not supported by the Constitution. E.g., Pharm. Research Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123
S. Ct. 1855, 1878 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("'[Tihe negative Commerce Clause has no basis
in the text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in applica-
tion."' (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatanna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting))); REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 97-98 ("The dormant
Commerce Clause lacks a foundation or justification in either the Constitution's text or history, and,
despite the efforts of respected constitutional scholars, the clause cannot be satisfactorily rationalized
outside the text of the Constitution."); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 428, 474-85 (1982) (arguing for a "radically diminished role for both the
dormant commerce clause and the Court as its interpreter"). While it is beyond the scope of this
article to consider these arguments in depth, Professor Donald H. Regan has made a convincing
argument concerning the validity of the dormant commerce clause:
There is much evidence that the main point of this grant [of the commerce power]...
was not to empower Congress, but rather to disable the states from regulating commerce
among themselves .... The framers wanted commerce among the states to be free of
state-originated mercantilist impositions. Giving Congress the power to regulate internal
commerce was one way of denying states that power, under the view, much more natural
to the framers than to us, that granted regulatory powers were exclusive.
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1125 (1986).
252. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1, at 309 (6th ed.
2000).
253. Id. at 310.
254. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71, 783-84 (1945) (finding that
the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the state's questionable interest in safety).
255. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 521-22, 529 (1959) (holding that the
Illinois mud flap law unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce where it conflicted with the
requirements of other jurisdictions).
256. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519-20, 527-28 (1935).
257. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 440.
258. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394 (1994) ("[T]he town may
not employ discriminatory regulation to give [the new waste center] an advantage over rival busi-
nesses from out of State.").
259. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
260. 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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Connecticut statute requiring "out-of-state shippers of beer to affirm that
their posted prices for products sold to Connecticut wholesalers are, as of
the moment of posting, no higher than the prices at which those products
are sold in the bordering States of Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode
Island" was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.26' The Court
noted "the Constitution's special concern both with the maintenance of a
national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on in-
terstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within
their respective spheres. 262 Limits on the extraterritorial effect of state
economic regulation involves three propositions.263 First, the Commerce
Clause forbids "the application of a state statute to commerce that takes
place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce
has effects within the State.' '26I In particular, a state may not enact legis-
lation that effectively establishes "'a scale of prices"' for other states.265
Second, a statute that has the practical effect of directly controlling
commerce that occurs completely outside a state's borders exceeds the
limits of that state's power, even if the legislature did not intend for the
statute to reach beyond state boundaries.266 Finally, a court evaluates a
statute's effect not only by considering the statute's direct consequences,
but by determining how the statute interacts with legitimate laws of other
states as well.267 The Commerce Clause "protects against inconsistent
legislation arising from the projection of one state regulatory regime into
the jurisdiction of another State," and it "dictates that no State may force
an out-of-state merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before
undertaking a transaction in another."
268
The Court concluded that the Connecticut statute effectively con-
trolled commercial activity wholly outside Connecticut.269 The Court
declared: "[T]he practical effect of this affirmation law, in conjunction
with the many other beer-pricing and affirmation laws that have been or
might be enacted throughout the country, is to create just the kind of
competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Com-
merce Clause was meant to preclude., 270 Moreover, the statute on its face
discriminated against brewers and shippers in interstate commerce be-
271
cause it applied entirely to interstate brewers or shippers of beer.
261. Healy, 491 U.S. at 326.
262. Id. at 335-36 (internal footnotes omitted).
263. Id. at 336.
264. Id. (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
265. Id. (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 528).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 337.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 340-41.
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Quill held unconstitutional North Dakota's "attempt to require an
out-of-state mail-order house that [had no] outlets nor sales representa-
tives in the State to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use
within the State., 272 In a 1967 case, the Court had held that a "seller
whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier
or the United States mail" lacked sufficient contacts with the state neces-
sary to impose a similar tax requirement.273 The Court in Quill refused to
modify this rule despite the "tremendous social, economic, commercial,
and legal innovations" since 1967.274
The Court will uphold "a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge
so long as the 'tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State."' 275 The Court stated that "[t]he first and fourth
prongs, which require a substantial nexus and a relationship between the
tax and state-provided services, limit the reach of state taxing authority
so as to ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden interstate
commerce. ' 276 Although the Court's rule that "a State may compel a
vendor to collect a sales or use tax" turns on the presence of "a small
sales force, plant, or office" in a taxing state may set a bright-line rule.277
Such a bright-line rule "firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate
state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces
litigation concerning those taxes. 278 In addition, if Congress disagrees
with this rule, it is free under the Commerce Clause to change it.
279
B. Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh
280
The Court's most recent dormant commerce clause decision, Walsh,
involved the "Maine Rx" program, enacted in 2000, which primarily
provided discounted drugs to Maine's uninsured, non-Medicaid citizens
through rebates from manufacturers to Maine pharmacies. 8' Under the
program, Maine would try to negotiate with drug manufacturers to pro-
vide rebates to fund reduced prices for drugs for program participants.282
If a manufacturer refused to enter into such an agreement, it would be
required to obtain prior authorization for its Medicaid sales.28 3 An or-
ganization of nonresident drug manufacturers challenged the program's
272. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301.
273. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
274. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02 (internal quotations omitted).
275. Id. at 311 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
276. Id. at 313.
277. ld. at 315.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 318.
280. 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).





constitutionality on the grounds that it was "pre-empted by the federal
Medicaid statute" and that it violated the dormant commerce clause.284
Maine had created the program to enable its residents to obtain pre-
scription drugs at a reduced price.285 The program's purpose was to en-
able non-Medicaid participants to purchase drugs at pharmacies dis-
counted to an amount approximately equivalent to the after-rebate price
of Medicaid purchases.2  The Court described the statute:
The statute provides that any manufacturer or "labeler" selling
drugs in Maine through any publicly supported financial assistance
program [i.e., Medicaid] "shall enter into a rebate agreement" with
the State Commissioner of Human Services (Commissioner). The
Commissioner is directed to use his best efforts to obtain a rebate that
is at least equal to the rebate calculated under the federal program
created pursuant to OBRA 1990. Rebates are to be paid into a fund
administered by the Commissioner, and then distributed to participat-
ing pharmacies to compensate them for selling at discounted
prices.
287
Among the penalties for a manufacturer's failure to enter into a rebate
agreement was the imposition of "prior authorization requirements in the
Medicaid program ... for the dispensing of prescription drugs provided• • • ,,288 rr
by those [nonparticipating] manufacturers and labelers. Under pro-
posed rules, access would be limited to "individuals who do not have a
comparable or superior prescription drug benefit plan" 289-in other
words, mainly uninsured Maine citizens.
The trial court granted the manufacturer's motion for a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that "Maine had no power to regulate the
prices paid to drug manufacturers in transactions that occur out of the
State," and "the Medicaid Act pre-empted Maine's Rx Program insofar
as it threatened to impose a prior authorization requirement on nonpar-
ticipating manufacturers.,, 290 The Court of Appeals reversed.29' The Su-
preme Court agreed with the court of appeals on both the preemption and
the dormant commerce clause challenges.292
Concerning the dormant commerce clause argument, the manufac-
turers contended that "the rebate requirement constitutes impermissible
extraterritorial regulation, and second, that it discriminates against inter-
284. Id.
285. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2681 (West Supp. 2002).
286. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1862.
287. Id. at 1863 (internal citations omitted).
288. tit. 22, § 2681(7).
289. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1863 (internal quotations omitted).
290. Id. at 1865.
291. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 85 (1st Cir. 2001).
292. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1870-71.
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state commerce in order to subsidize in-state retail sales., 293 The Court
rejected both arguments. 294 Concerning the first contention, the Court
declared, "unlike price control or price affirmation statutes, 'the Maine
Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by
its express terms or by its inevitable effect.', 295 Maine neither requires
that drug manufacturers sell to wholesalers at a fixed price, nor is it tying
the price of Maine products to out-of-state prices.296 Concerning the sec-
ond contention, the manufacturers relied on West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy,297 which held that a state may not make an assessment on out-of-
state dairy farmers for the benefit of in-state dairy farmers that "effec-
tively imposed a tax on out-of-state producers to subsidize production by
their in-state competitors. 298 The manufacturers contended that Maine's
Rx fund was similar to West Lynn in that it was created by rebates from
out-of-state manufacturers, and it was employed "to subsidize sales by
local pharmacists to local consumers., 299 The Court, however, found that
West Lynn was not applicable because the Maine program would "not
impose a disparate burden on any competitors." 3°° The Court added: "A
manufacturer could not avoid its rebate obligation by opening production
facilities in Maine and would receive no benefit from the rebates even if
it did so; the payments to the local pharmacists provide no special benefit
to competitors of rebate-paying manufacturers."' '3
C. Evaluation of Walsh
Walsh is a retreat from the dormant commerce clause analysis seen
in Healy and Quill. First, the Court is wrong that the statute does not
constitute external regulation. Maine does require manufacturers to sell
their drugs for a certain price; it is disingenuous to say that a rebate (a
price reduction) is not part of the price. Also, Maine is not controlling
retail sales that occur in Maine; it is regulating wholesale transactions
outside the state. Most of the wholesale sales happened out-of-state, and
the manufacturers had nothing to do with the drugs once they were sold
to the distributors.30 2 In other words, Maine is regulating prices paid in
out-of-state transactions; it is extending its authority outside its bor-
293. Id. at 1870.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1871 (quoting Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82).
296. Id.
297. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).




302. See Petitioner's Brief at 29, Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (No. 01-188) ("Typically, both the
manufacturers and their customers (independent wholesalers and distributors) are located outside
Maine. The drugs are usually delivered at the manufacturers' facilities outside Maine .. . .The
wholesalers and distributors then sell the drugs to their customers, including pharmacies in Maine.").
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ders.3 °3 It is hard to understand how the Court could hold that imposing
taxes on an out-of-state retailer who sold products to state residents by
mail violated the dormant commerce clause,3°4 but that Maine regulating
out-of-state sales from a manufacturer to a wholesaler did not. Also, as in
Quill, Maine is violating the first and fourth prongs of the Complete Auto
Transit test. 30 5 First, the activity-out-of-state sales from manufacturers
to distributors--does not have a "substantial nexus" with Maine. Al-
though the drugs eventually go into Maine, the relevant transactions oc-
curred outside of Maine. Thus, the rebate is like a tax on an out-of-state
sale. Similarly, the out-of-state sales are not fairly related to services
provided by Maine since Maine provides no services in relation to the
transactions.
Second, the rebate program does have an external effect and an in-
ternal benefit-it burdens interstate commerce to subsidize in-state retail
sales. Manufacturers will have to raise the prices they sell their drugs for
in other states in order to make up for the Maine rebate. Also, Maine
pharmacies and citizens are being benefited at the expense of out-of-state
citizens who pay those higher prices. Thus, there has been a redistribu-
tion from out-of-state manufacturers and consumers to in-state pharma-
cists and consumers.30 6 While such redistribution may be justifiable on
public policy grounds, redistribution from out-of-state citizens to in-state
citizens is the province of the federal government, not a state.30 7 As the
petitioner pointed out, Maine had constitutional alternatives to help
needy citizens buy drugs.30 8 The alternatives included subsidizing drug
purchases out of general revenues, giving state income tax credits for
drug purchases, or imposing a tax on retail pharmacy sales in Maine.3°
What Maine should not have been allowed to do is to fund its program
by burdening interstate commerce.
303. See Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642-63 ("The Commerce Clause also precludes the application of
a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the
commerce has effects within the State.").
304. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02; Nat'l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
305. Brady, 430 U.S. at 279.
306. As the Court pointed out, it is true that, unlike West Lynn, there has been no discrimina-
tion against out-of-state competitors. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. at 1871. However, the dormant commerce
clause protects more than out-of-state competitors; it protects all those who operate in interstate
commerce. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 405 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]e have long recognized
that 'a burden imposed by a State upon interstate commerce is not to be sustained simply because the
statute imposing it applies alike to . . . the people of the State enacting such statute."' (quoting
Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83 (1891))); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y.
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 580 (1986) ("Economic protectionism is not limited to attempts to
convey advantages on local merchants; it may include attempts to give local consumers an advantage
over consumers in other States.").
307. Of course state regulation often has externalities and all externalities cannot be avoided.
However, this externality seems more direct and substantial than many other ones.
308. Petitioner's Brief at 26, Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (No. 01-188).
309. Id.
2003]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
IV. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE FUTURE OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
A. Evaluation of the Rehnquist Court's Horizontal Federalism Cases
As one can see, the Rehnquist Court has been inconsistent in how it
has treated horizontal federalism. It has placed strong due process con-
straints on a state's ability to impose punitive damages based on conduct
in other states, it has continued the minimal full faith and credit con-
straints for choice of law that date back to the New Deal Court, and it has
cut back on constraints under the dormant commerce clause and created
confusing exceptions to the full faith and credit rule for judgments. In
viewing the Rehnquist Court's horizontal federalism cases as a whole,
one must conclude that the Court lacks any coherent jurisprudence con-
cerning the relations of the states. Instead, the Court treats each area of
horizontal federalism separately, without considering what it is doing in
another area. In fact, one might argue that the Court is not thinking about
horizontal federalism at all, but rather that the results in horizontal feder-
alism cases are due to other purposes that have nothing to do with hori-
zontal federalism. How else can one explain the Court's due process rule
in punitive damages cases that a state cannot impose its policies on other
states in contrast to the Court's failure to give the Full Faith and Credit
Clause any content, when the Full Faith and Credit Clause's main pur-
pose is to prevent the imposition of one state's policies on another?
Why has the Court given such attention to vertical federalism and
almost none to horizontal federalism? The answer lies partially in the
reasons behind the Court's vertical federalism. The main purpose behind
the new vertical federalism seems to be distrust of the national govern-
ment and the related attempt to increase the authority and dignity of state
governments. 310 The New Deal saw the beginning of a "liberal" revolu-
tion that increased the power of the federal government and eliminated
the constraints on vertical federalism. 31' This bigger government, from
the 1930s to the present, has furthered liberal values at the expense of
conservative values. Thus, a way for a conservative Court to change this
310. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, in THE
REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 195, 198 (Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002) ("A cornerstone of
the Rehnquist Court's approach to constitutional law has been the protection of states from perceived
federal intrusions."); MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATrERS, How IT COULD
HAPPEN 80 (1999) ("[T]he core of the Supreme Court's federalism is not citizen choice and state
competition but the preservation of state and local sovereignty."); Greve, supra note 15, at 95; Rosa-
lie Berger Levinson, First Monday-The Dark Side of Federalism in the Nineties: Restricting Rights
of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (1998) ("Although this term [federalism] refers
to maintaining a proper balance between state and federal power, to the Rehnquist Court it has meant
restoring power to the states."); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748-49 (1999) (recognizing
sovereign immunity as a means for preserving the dignity and respect owed to states).
311. See Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 75 (stating that "[f]rom 1937 to 1995, federalism
was part of a Constitution in exile" (internal quotations omitted)).
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trend was to cut back on the power of the federal government in relation
to the states. This purpose does not carry over to horizontal federalism.
Other explanations for the new vertical federalism cannot com-
pletely support it. Some writers, including the present author, have advo-
cated enforcing the Constitution's structural provisions (that allocate
power) as a basis for a new, principled federalism. 312 However, it is clear
that this reason, at best, is only secondary for the Rehnquist Court's ver-
tical federalism. While cases that limit Congress' power to pass statutes,
such as Lopez and Morrison, are well-ground in Article I and the Tenth
Amendment, sovereign immunity cases such as Alden lack any textual
basis in the Constitution. Moreover, if the Court were giving greater at-
tention to the Constitution's structural provisions, it would have given
greater content to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Hyatt and applied
its due process constraints from punitive damages cases to other areas.
What has happened in horizontal federalism is that the Court has
mainly continued the principles from previous Courts without thinking
much about how horizontal federalism affects our national system and
without trying to come up with consistent jurisprudence for all areas of
federalism. 313 As noted earlier, when the Court did place greater con-
straints on punitive damages, it did so because of its concern with large
punitive damages, not a concern with horizontal federalism. Horizontal
federalism was not the purpose for these cases; it was the justification for
another purpose. Thus, horizontal federalism has developed in the
piecemeal fashion described earlier, with strong constraints in one area
and almost none in others.
B. Justifications for Greater Constraints on Horizontal Federalism
As has been demonstrated above, horizontal federalism can be
firmly grounded in the constitutional text;314 it does not depend for its
existence on normative views or conceptions outside the text, as state
sovereign immunity does in Alden and its progeny.315 Thus, all the Court
has to do is enforce the Constitution's Due Process Clause, Full Faith
and Credit Clause, dormant commerce clause, and other horizontal fed-
eralism provisions. As mentioned above, not enforcing those provisions
gives some parts of the Constitution meaning and other parts none at all.
312. See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 895-96 (4th Cir.
1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring), affd sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000);
Fruehwald, The New Federalism, supra note 199, at 865-66; Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels, supra
note 15, at 444-51, 494-96; REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCrURE, supra note 199, at 6, 164.
313. See Greve, supra note 15, at 106 ("When it comes to the regulation of economic conduct,
the Supreme Court has sustained the regime established under the New Deal: a vast realm of virtu-
ally unlimited, concurrent powers, which both the states and the national government occupy.").
314. See discussion supra Part 1.
315. I will present several normative justifications for horizontal federalism below. However,
no matter how strong a normative justification is, to be valid, the policy must be supported by the
constitutional text.
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Does horizontal federalism matter? Policy reasons supporting hori-
zontal federalism include: (1) a state should not be able to interfere with
the proper authority of another state; (2) the danger of interstate rivalry;
(3) a state should not be able to improperly externalize costs and internal-
ize benefits; (4) the lack of political safeguards that prevents a state from
overextending its authority; (5) horizontal federalism allows for local
choice and experimentation, and it is often more efficient; and (6) hori-
zontal federalism protects individuals.
The first justification for horizontal federalism is that a state should
not be able to interfere with the sovereignty of other states. As previously
noted, the New Deal Revolution not only removed constraints from the
federal government increasing federal power, it eliminated many of the
constraints on states increasing state power.316 The net result was that
governments on all levels had more regulatory power.317 Equally impor-
tant, a state may be able to extend its authority beyond its borders, creat-
ing clashes with other states.318
While the question of whether increased government is good or bad
is complicated, the lack of horizontal constraints that allows one state to
interfere with the authority of other states is a real problem. 319 A state
should not be able to apply its law to a matter unless it is connected to an
event within the state's borders;320 a state should not be able to extend its
authority to interfere with the sovereignty of other states.321 Democracy
should be respected, but laws should be made by the proper democratic
institution. All states are equal in authority to the other states under our
Constitution; one state should not be able to decide the policies of an-
other state.322 A state is not sovereign if another state can regulate within
the scope of its authority. If a state wants to adopt a policy that is differ-
ent than the policies of all other states, that state should be able to do so
as long as the policy does not violate the Constitution. For example,
while one state may believe that strict liability is a proper basis for re-
covery in products liability cases, another state may feel that proof of
negligence should be required. Both positions have sound reasons sup-
porting them, and a state should be able to choose which one it wants.
316. See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 485-91; Greve, supra note 15, at 105-06.
317. See Gardbaum, supra note 16, at 485-91; Greve, supra note 15, at 105-06.
318. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550 (1935) (settling
conflict of California and Alaska worker's compensation laws); Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502, 504-05 (1939) (same).
319. See Greve, supra note 15, at 106-07 (noting that "[o]ne cannot unshackle the states with-
out allowing them to exploit each other").
320. Laycock, supra note 120, at 251.
321. See Greve, supra note 15, at 122 (observing that "[s]tate autonomy cannot possibly entail
a license to aggress and exploit").
322. See id. at 99 ("Federalism rests on principles of state autonomy and equality: each state
governs its own territory and citizens but not, of course, the territory and citizens of sister states.");
Laycock, supra note 120, at 288 ("The Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that the
several states are of equal authority.").
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The same applies to most decisions states make, such as gun control,
medical malpractice, and domestic relations law. Only when a state's
decision exceeds the Constitution or requires a nationwide solution
should an institution intrude. Those institutions should be the Supreme
Court and Congress, not co-equal states.
Second, interstate rivalry was a concern at the time of the Constitu-
tion's drafting.323 As Professor Richard B. Collins has stated, "[i]nterstate
rivalry was the Convention's greatest concern. Small states feared the
power of large, and the South feared commercial domination by the
North and federal interference with slavery. '32 4 As is well-known, James
Madison considered the Union as a check on factions, declaring "[t]he
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
other States .... , 325 In a letter to George Washington, he wrote:
Over and above this positive power, a negative in all cases what-
soever on the legislative acts of the States, as heretofore exercised by
the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely necessary, and
to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdictions.
Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given
on paper will be evaded [and] defeated. The States will continue to
invade the national jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of na-
tions [and] to harass each other with rival and spiteful measures dic-
tated by mistaken views of interest.
326
Interstate rivalry is still a concern today. Professor Laycock has written:
"It is critical to the Union that we continue to think of ourselves as a sin-
gle people, and it is important that we not knowingly create legitimate
interstate grievances. 327
Third, states should not be able to externalize costs and internalize
benefits, giving benefits to itself or its citizens, but placing part of the
328cost on other states or their citizens. An obvious example is the limit
323. Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 53
(1988).
324. Id.
325. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 62 (James Madison) (Carl Van Doren ed., The Easton Press
1979).
326. 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 383-84 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
327. Laycock, supra note 120, at 264; see also Greve, supra note 15, at 95 ("[Federalism] must
also protect states from aggression and exploitation by other states; moreover, it must protect the
common economic market from regulatory balkanization.").
328. See John S. Baker, Jr., Respecting a State's Tort Law, While Confining Its Reach to that
State, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 698, 699 (2001) ("Unfortunately, Supreme Court decisions regarding
personal jurisdiction and choice of law, premised on the Due Process Clause rather than the territo-
rial structure of federalism, have had the unforeseen effect of allowing some states to impose their
laws and costs on other states."); Collins, supra note 323, at 67 (arguing that when states "impose
the cost of suppression on outsiders, they interfere in policy choices of other states or the federal
government, and judicial intervention may be warranted"); Greve, supra note 15, at 100 ("Manufac-
turers have no practical way of keeping their products out of particular jurisdictions. Plaintiffs, on
the other hand, get to choose their own forum and law. As a result, the most restrictive and plaintiff-
20031
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on punitive damages in Campbell and Gore, which prevents states from
giving punitive damages to its citizens for injuries suffered by the citi-
zens of other states.329 Another example would be limiting a state's abil-
ity to impose its tort rules on an occurrence in another state that is com-
pletely connected to that other state except that the injured party is from
the first state. For instance, a New York citizen goes to Massachusetts for
an operation in a Massachusetts hospital by Massachusetts doctors.
330
The patient cannot obtain the operation in New York because New York
doctors do not perform that operation since it is new and the cost of mal-
practice insurance is high in New York. On the other hand, Massachu-
setts has put damages caps on medical malpractice recoveries in order to
encourage the best doctors to practice in Massachusetts and to provide
the best medical care for its citizens. The patient dies due to the sur-
geon's malpractice, and his widow files suit in a New York court to re-
cover damages. If the New York court ignores the Massachusetts mal-
practice limit, it is giving its citizens unearned benefits, while unfairly
externalizing the cost on Massachusetts and its citizens. The New York
citizen is getting the benefit of New York law for an occurrence in Mas-
sachusetts, while not having to suffer the burdens of that benefit-
inferior health care in New York. Thus, New York has made a transfer of
wealth to one of its citizens by extending its law into Massachusetts. In
addition, New York has imposed its policies on Massachusetts. New
York has substituted its tort law for that of Massachusetts in a case that is
internal to Massachusetts; New York has applied its law to a matter that
has no connection to an event within its territory. As mentioned above,
the Court has declared that "[a] State does not acquire ... supervision
over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and
health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that
State."33'
friendly jurisdiction will effectively impose its liability and product norms on the entire country and
redistribute income from out-of-state manufacturers (and their shareholders and workers) to in-state
plaintiffs in the process."); Laycock, supra note 120, at 251 ("[I]n deciding which things or events
control choice of law, a state's interests in enriching local citizens and extending the territorial reach
of its own law are illegitimate.").
Professor McConnell has posed a similar argument that the cost of a state's liability laws are
borne nationwide and that "consumers in states with less generous products-liability laws pay" part
of the recoveries received by plaintiffs in the more generous states. See Michael W. McConnell, A
Choice-of-Law Approach to Products Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECrIONS iN LIABILITY LAW 90,
92-93 (Walter Olson ed., 1988). He adds: "Each state can profit at the expense of the others by
expanding its scope of liability, at least until the others catch up." Id. at 92. "Under these conditions,
states no longer serve as laboratories for social experimentation." Id. at 97.
It may not always be possible to prevent some externalization of costs to other states. For ex-
ample, when one state imposes large compensatory damages in a products liability suit, the cost of
the damages may be spread among consumers in other states. However, constraints on horizontal
federalism will help prevent externalization to a significant degree.
329. See discussion supra Part .
330. This hypothetical is based on Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1973),
where the appellate court refused to apply Massachusetts's statutory damage limitation.
331. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975). As a New York court said over 140
years ago, "[tihe position that a citizen carries with him, into every State into which he may go, the
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Fourth, political safeguards do not constrain a state from overex-
tending its power. It has been argued (unsuccessfully) in recent vertical
federalism cases that "politics" should control the relationship between
the federal and state governments-that federal courts do not need to
protect states' rights because the political branches, Congress and the
Executive, can do so.332 The political branches, however, are not disinter-
ested concerning whether the federal government has overstepped its
authority and interfered with states' rights. As Justice Kennedy has con-
tended, "the absence of structural mechanisms to require those officials
[in the political branches] to undertake this principled task [of protecting
state authority], and the momentary political convenience often attendant
upon their failure to do so, argue against a complete renunciation of the
judicial role., 333 Further, "the federal balance is too essential a part of our
constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for
us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level of Govern-
ment has tipped the scales too far. 334
It should be obvious that politics as a constraint is an even weaker
argument in horizontal federalism cases. There is no political safeguard
against a state overextending its legal authority against another state or
one of its citizens. Congress cannot protect a particular state because it
enacts uniform rules. In fact, when Congress is acting at the behest of the
states, it is imposing the majority state view on the minority of states.335
Moreover, in the area of choice of law, Congress has not intervened.
Thus, the federal courts need to regulate the relations of the states be-
cause they are the only institution that can deal with the states neu-
trally.
336
Fifth, as pointed out in Part II, state lawmaking allows for local
choice and experimentation. It is also often more efficient. 337 As Profes-
sor Collins has pointed out:
Efficiency of local lawmaking is a basic justification for state
autonomy in the federal system. Local lawmaking can be more ex-
actly tailored to particular problems and can more readily experiment
with different solutions. Competition among legal systems generates
legal institutions of the one in which he was born, cannot be supported." Lemon v. People, 20 N.Y.
562, 609 (N.Y. 1860).
332. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) ("State sovereign interests ... are more properly
protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power.").
333. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
334. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335. Baker & Young, supra note 119, at 117-18.
336. See Laycock, supra note 120, at 259 ("The results [in choice of law] have been predicta-
bly chaotic, because federal abdication leaves no disinterested umpire to resolve an important class
of interstate disputes. State law cannot supply the answers, because the questions are about interstate
relations and no state is empowered to answer for any other.").
337. See Collins, supra note 323, at 68.
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efficiencies as jurisdictions compete to attract and retain people and
capital. Local lawmaking best serves these ends when people and re-
sources are mobile and when local laws do not export significant
costs.
33 8
Finally and most importantly, horizontal federalism protects indi-
viduals from a state's overreaching. 339 A state should not be able to ex-
tend its laws to an individual who has no connection or a tenuous con-
nection to that state. Moreover, an individual should not be subject to the
contrary laws of different states for a single transaction or occurrence. As
Professor Laycock has noted: "People cannot obey the law unless they
know it; they cannot know the law unless they know which law to
learn. 340 In the original Constitution (before the Bill of Rights), protec-
tion of individuals came from a division of power;34' that protection
should not be diluted by permitting states to subject an individual to a
tug-of-war. In addition, when a state exploits its own citizens, those citi-
zens can protect themselves through the right to vote. Foreigners to that
state lack such protection. In sum, it is hard to understand why the Court
has been enforcing individual rights under the due process and equal
protection clauses, while ignoring protections for individuals under hori-
zontal federalism. Having a state's law applied to an individual when
another state's law should govern is just as wrong as equal protection or
due process violations. 42
Are there reasons not to regulate horizontal federalism? First, one
might argue that in striking down state action, a federal court is interfer-
338. Id.; see also McConnell, The Founders' Design, supra note 119, at 1493-1500 (setting
forth three arguments in favor of decentralized, local decision making).
339. Cf New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("The Constitution does not
protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract politi-
cal entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To the contrary, the
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individu-
als.").
340. Laycock, supra note 120, at 319.
341. See Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1373. Professor Steven G. Calabresi pointed out that until
at least the 1950s, constitutional law was mainly concerned with division of authority, not personal
liberty. Id. Individual freedom was protected mainly through the Constitution's structural provisions.
Id. He also noted that "the text of our written Constitution devotes only fifty-two words to the pro-
tection of individual liberty from the depredations of state government in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, while devoting several thousand words to the subject of allocating and dividing power among
governmental institutions." Id. at 1376-77.
342. One author has gone further and argued that a particular kind of factionalism justifies
constraints on horizontal federalism and state power. See Greve, supra note 15, at 123-26. Michael
Greve has written that without limitations on the states, "trial lawyers and activist state attorneys
general are launching assaults on sister states .... [T]he product liability crisis-as well as state
litigation campaigns against the tobacco, financial, and pharmaceutical industries--demonstrate that
state aggression presents an increasingly serious economic and constitutional problem." Id. at 96. He
continued: "Their initiatives ... are not simply an attack on corporate America (which may deserve
it); they are also, and inherently, an assault on the integrity, autonomy, and equality of sister states."
Id. He concluded that the Court has "brought us to the brink of being unable to preempt the trial
bar." Id. This author agrees that Mr. Greve has identified a problem; however, I believe that the
problem is not as serious as he asserts. In particular, I am not concerned by recent actions by state
attorneys general to protect their citizens.
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ing with democratic decisions of that state. However, there is no "coun-
termajoritarian" difficulty here. The court is not overruling a proper de-
mocratic decision; it is saying that the state had no power to apply its law
to a situation. Thus, a court is acting "more as an umpire than as a law-
maker., 343 Second, one might contend that the federal courts are interfer-
ing with state sovereignty. However, a court cannot interfere with sover-
eignty that does not exist. Finally, one might wonder whether the en-
forcement of horizontal federalism is worth the cost. The reasons given
above, especially the protection of individuals, more than justify the cost.
C. The Future of Horizontal Federalism
What criteria should the Court use to regulate horizontal federal-
ism?344 First, any regulation should respect each state's sovereignty. Any
constraint should restrict a state's ability to extend its laws beyond its
authority, but not interfere with its rightful sovereignty. Second, any
regulation should limit the reach of a state's laws and activities so as not
to intrude on the sovereignty of other states and not to impose improper
externalities on other states or bring improper benefits into the state.
Third, horizontal federalism should be based on pragmatic territorialism,
not strict territorialism, which would always limit the reach of a state's
laws to its borders.345 In other words, a state should be able to regulate
343. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1383. As Professor Calabresi has noted, "[miajority rule or
democracy presupposes that one knows and respects the relevant jurisdictional lines." Id. at 1391.
344. While this author feels that courts should protect state sovereignty from encroachment by
other states through the Due Process Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the dormant
commerce clause, author Michael Greve believes that it can best be done by eliminating the pre-
sumption against federal preemption. See Greve, supra note 15, at 116-25. He has written:
Preemptive statutes, in contrast [to regulatory statutes], merely establish limits within
which states remain free to do as they wish. Preemptive statutes are inherently less intru-
sive than regulatory statutes. Thus, there is no functional justification for subjecting them
to a judicial test of the devastating force of the clear statement rule.
Id. at 117. The main reason that Mr. Greve emphasizes preemption rather than other doctrines is
because although he believes the other horizontal federalism doctrines are important, he has little
confidence in horizontal federalism doctrines succeeding at this time. See id. at 121-22.
I am not sure that eliminating the presumption against preemption would be a good thing be-
cause it would curtail the states' ability to create diverse policies. For example, regardless of the
legal basis, I do not think that the decision in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570-71
(2001), which preempted Massachusetts's stricter regulation on tobacco advertising, is good from a
normative viewpoint. States should be able to adopt stricter laws than the federal government when
they only apply internally. Also, I am more confident that the Court can change its horizontal feder-
alism doctrines in light of Campbell and Gore. I am also hopeful that the Court will become con-
vinced that enforcing the structural provisions of the Constitution is important in both vertical and
horizontal federalism. Finally, the Court has unanimously rejected challenges to state statutes and
common law on federal preemption grounds in two cases in the 2002-2003 term. See Ky. Ass'n of
Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002).
345. Strict territorialism is where a state's laws always stop at its borders. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.1, at 19 (1834) ("[E]very nation possesses an
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory."). Strict territorialism was the basis of
the territorial personal jurisdiction rule in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878). "One of these
principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. "The other principle of public law follows
from the one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
out-of-state conduct that has a significant effect in the state, such as out-
of-state defamation that causes injury to someone's reputation in the
state.346 Finally, any regulation should be principled; it should be firmly
ground in the Constitution's structural provisions, and it should be ap-
plied consistently and neutrally.
1. Due Process Constraints
The Court should continue its due process approach as seen in
Campbell and Gore, with the refinements in reasoning mentioned in Part
I.B. Further, the Court should extend its approach to other areas. It
should step in whenever a state has extended its laws beyond their proper
limits and applied them to individuals with which the state or those laws
do not have a proper connection. In particular, as this author has previ-
ously suggested, the Court should place due process limitations on a
state's choice of law.347 Prior to the New Deal Court, the Court had im-
posed significant due process limitations on a state's choice of law. 348 As
was true of the Full Faith and Credit Clause limits on a state's choice of
law discussed in Part II, beginning in the mid-1930s, the Court began to
move to minimal due process constraints on choice of law that resulted in
the Allstate rule, which allows a state to apply its law when it has even a
tenuous connection to a case. 349 However, when a state applies its law to
a case when it has only a tenuous connection to an individual, a case, or
an issue in that case, it is violating the individual's due process rights in
the same way that it violates the defendant's due process rights in a puni-
tive damages case when the punitive damages are based on conduct in
other states.
This author has previously suggested a two-part test to determine
whether a state's choice of law is proper under the Due Process
Clause.350 First, the court should apply a rational basis test: is there a
reasonable relation between the law's reach and its legitimate purpose?
Second, when the laws of two or more states might apply under step one,
persons or property without its territory." Id.; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.12, at 46 (1935) ("By its very nature law must apply to everything and must
exclusively apply to everything within the boundary of its jurisdiction."); id. at § 5.2, at 52 (stating
"[tihat the law is territorial, that there can be no law in a particular state except the law of that state.
. .11).
346. See Allen Rostron, The Supreme Court, the Gun Industry, and the Misguided Revival of
Strict Territorial Limits on the Reach of State Law, 2003 DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
115, 124-25. Mr. Rostron has described the end of strict territorialism during the New Deal Court:
They did so, not by forsaking the notion that the fundamental limit on state power is terri-
torial, but by adopting a more expansive view of what it means for a state to have author-
ity over its territory. Courts began to recognize a state's authority to regulate conduct that
has effects within the state's borders, regardless of where the conduct occurs.
Id.
347. FRuEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 101, at 67-76.
348. Id. at 12-14.
349. Id. at 32-35.
350. Id. at 74.
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the Court should determine whether one of the state's laws has a signifi-
cantly closer connection to the case. When a state has applied its law to a
controversy when another state has a closer connection to that contro-
versy, the first state has violated the individual's due process rights. The
state has overreached by making conduct that is legal in the state that has
the closest connection to a case illegal. Thus, as was mentioned above in
connection with full faith and credit, a state should not be allowed to
apply its law to a matter when another state has a significantly closer
connection.
For example, assume that Georgia allows strict liability in products
liability cases against retailers, but California does not. A Georgia resi-
dent goes to California for a two-week vacation, and when he gets there
he buys a new car from a California retailer, which he intends to use on
his vacation, then drive back to Georgia. After he returns to Georgia, he
is seriously injured in an automobile accident. He sues the manufacturer
and retailer of the car under strict liability in a Georgia court. Assuming
there is no personal jurisdiction problem, should Georgia be able to apply
its strict liability law to the California retailer? While Georgia has an
interest in protecting its citizens for accidents that happen in Georgia,
Georgia should not be able to apply its law because California has a sig-
nificantly closer connection to the case. The issue is whether a Georgia
defendant can sue a California retailer who has no connection to Georgia.
For this issue, California obviously has the closer connection. The trans-
action occurred in California. The retailer has no connection with Geor-
gia. The Georgia resident bought the car in California. California should
be able to regulate the conduct of retailers who operate only in Califor-
nia; Georgia should not be able to extend its law to California to regulate
a California retailer. If the Georgia consumer had wanted the Georgia
protection, he could have bought the car in Georgia.
Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia351 illustrates the proper application of the
Court's due process standard from Gore by a state court to areas other
than punitive damages. In Yu, the Yus, California residents, filed a class
action in California against Signet Bank/Virginia and Capitol One Bank,
both Virginia corporations, for eight causes of action,352 including "dis-
tant forum abuse. 353 Although the parties' agreement said that it would
be governed by Virginia and federal law, the Yus never used the credit
card in Virginia or went to Virginia. 354 The Yus failed to make payments
on their account. 355 Signet dealt with out-of-state debtors who defaulted
351. 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
352. Yu, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307-08.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
on their accounts by filing suit in Virginia district trial courts.35
6 More
than ninety percent of the lawsuits ended in default judgments.357
The Yus received a "Warrant in Debt," which was similar to a Cali-
fornia summons and complaint but filed in Richmond, Virginia, claiming
that they owed Signet $2,191.38 plus interest. 358 The Yus claimed they
did not understand the warrant's legal effect.359 After a default judgment
was obtained against the Yus, a garnishment summons was served on the
Virginia office of Mr. Yu's employer.
The Yus filed a class action suit in California against the banks, as-
serting: (1) tortious violation of California Code of Civil Procedure §
395(b); (2) abuse of process; (3) tortious violation of California Code of
Civil Procedure §§ 1710.10 et. seq. and 1913(a); (4) violation of due
process; (5) restitution and injunctive relief under California Business
and Professional Code § 17200; (6) violation of California Civil Code §
1788.15; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (8) intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 36' The trial court granted the banks' mo-
tion for summary judgment.
362
After finding that the Virginia court had lacked personal jurisdiction
over the Yus, 363 the appellate court addressed the Yus' claim of "distant
forum abuse. ' '36 In Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n,365 the Cali
fornia Supreme Court held that a creditor who "wilfully commenced
actions in improper [venues], with knowledge that such [venues] are
improper, and for the improper ulterior purpose of impairing its adversar-
ies' ability to defend such suits," is guilty of "gross abuse of process"
and "unlawful ... business practice."366 The Yu court felt that the distant
forum abuse was even worse than in Barquis because Barquis involved
the wrong venue within California, while Yu involved the wrong jurisdic-
tion in another state altogether.367 Under California law, the suit should
356. Id.
357. Id. The bank sent a "change of jurisdiction" letter to the debtors, which advised the debt-
ors that the bank intended to file suit in Virginia and that, if they preferred trial in their state, they
must give notice within twenty-one days. Id. If the customer requested a change of jurisdiction, the
bank would dismiss the Virginia action. Id. The Yus disputed that they had received the letter. See
id.
358. Id. at 307-08.




363. Id. at 311.
364. See id. at 311-15.
365. 496 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1972).
366. Barquis, 496 P.2d at 820 (finding that this practice by creditors is prohibited under Cali-
fornia statutes) (internal quotations omitted).
367. Yu, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312.
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have been filed in the county where the debtor lived, or the county where
the contract was formed or to be performed.368
As one of their defenses, the banks asserted that Gore barred the
claims because their program was lawful in Virginia and that "California
cannot 'regulate' conduct 'that is lawful in other states."'3 69 The court
responded that Gore supported the Yus' claim rather than the banks'
defense, stating:
The [Gore] case would thus prohibit an award of punitive dam-
ages herein to punish or deter respondents' conduct with respect to
consumers in states other than California. However, appellants are
not seeking any such award. [Gore] establishes that California may
indeed protect its own consumers, and punish the conduct of an out-
of-state defendant if it has an impact on them regardless of whether
the conduct might be lawful elsewhere.
370
The court, however, found that four of the statutes sued upon by the
Yus involving California actions and California judgments could not
have out-of-state applicability. 37' In addition to the fact that the court
368. Id.
369. Id. at 313.
370. Id. at 314.
371. Id. at 315-17. The court reviewed the statutes sued upon and the Yus' allegations as fol-
lows:
The first cause of action in appellants' complaint is for violation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 395, subdivision (b), which provides in relevant part: "Subject to the
power of the court to transfer actions or proceedings as provided in this title, in an action
arising from an offer or provision of goods, services, loans or extensions of credit in-
tended primarily for personal, family or household use.... the county in which the buyer
or lessee resided at the time the contract was entered into, or the county in which the
buyer or lessee resides at the commencement of the action is the proper county for the
trial thereof." Appellants contend that Signet violated this venue statute by suing them in
Virginia.
The third cause of action in the complaint is for violation of Code of Civil Procedure
section 1710.10, et seq., which set forth the procedures for entry of a California judgment
based on a sister state judgment, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1913, subdivision
(a), which provides in pertinent part that "the effect of a judicial record of a sister state is
the same in this state as in the state where it was made, except that it can only be enforced
in this state by an action or special proceeding." Appellants contend that Signet violated
these statutes when it enforced the Virginia judgment by serving a wage garnishment or-
der in Virginia, rather than domesticating the judgment in California as provided in these
statutes.
The sixth cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 1788.15, which states
that: "(a) No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt by means
of judicial proceedings when the debt collector knows that service of process, where es-
sential to jurisdiction over the debtor or his property, has not been legally effected. [1] (b)
No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a consumer debt, other than one re-
duced to judgment, by means of judicial proceedings in a county other than the county in
which the debtor has incurred the consumer debt or the county in which the debtor re-
sides at the time such proceedings are instituted, or resided at the time the debt was in-
curred." (Civ.Code, § 1788.15.) Appellants contend that Signet violated these provisions
of the Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Civ.Code, § 1788 et seq.)
by suing them in Virginia before their debt was otherwise reduced to judgment," and by
improperly garnishing Mr. Yu's wages.
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thought that the statutes were not intended to have out-of-state
applicability, it believed that applying the statutes extraterritorially
would violate Gore's admonition that "no state can 'impose its own
policy choice' on others, or 'legislate except with reference to its own
jurisdiction.' ,
372
In Yu, the court properly applied the horizontal federalism princi-
ples from Gore. It did not violate due process to extend the Barquis
abuse of process action to Virginia banks who filed suit in Virginia, even
if such actions are legal in Virginia, because the effect was felt in Cali-
fornia. Thus, California had an interest in protecting its own consumers
and economy.373 It was not trying to regulate conduct that was legal in
Virginia; it was trying to protect California consumers from illegal out-
of-state conduct.
Under my refined due process analysis, Yu is also correct. It is not a
violation of the banks' due process rights to be left alone by a state that
has little or no connection to the banks or occurrence. Further, it does not
offend the Due Process Clause to have California law applied to them
when the consumers lived in California, the banks solicited the consum-
ers by mail in California, they intended to collect a debt against Califor-
nia consumers, and the injury they caused was felt in California. In fact,
this author would argue that California had a significantly closer connec-
tion to the controversy than Virginia based on the above connections and
the Yus' lack of any connection to Virginia.
The court's holding that the California statutes concerning Califor-
nia actions and judgments could not be applied to violations in Virginia
was also correct because California cannot extend its procedural rules to
Virginia actions. California has no interest in governing Virginia actions
and judgments, even if its own residents are involved.
The [Robbins-Rosenthal] Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides for recovery in
an individual action of the debtor's actual damages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees
and costs, plus a fine of $100 to $1,000 if the creditor's violation is willful and knowing.
(Civ.Code, § 1788.30.) Appellants seek tort damages for the alleged violations of the
Code of Civil Procedure under the theory that "'[v]iolation of a statute embodying a pub-
lic policy is generally actionable even though no specific remedy is provided in the stat-
ute; any injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute was enacted may
bring an action.' [] The effect of such statutes, in essence, is to create a duty or standard
of conduct, the breach of which, where it causes injury, gives rise to liability in tort."
(Castillo v. Friedman (1987) 243 Cal.Rptr. 206, 197 Cal.App.3d.Supp. 6, 14 [citations
omitted]; see Czap v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 86
Cal.Rptr. 417 [recognizing tort action for violation of former unfair debt collection prac-
tice statute]; Debt Collection Tort Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1971) pp. 84-86.) We need not
decide whether damages are recoverable under this theory because these statutes are in-
applicable in appellants' case in any event.
Id. at 315-16.
372. Id. at 317 (quoting BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996)).
373. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 585 (holding that a state can further its interest in protecting its own
consumers, but lacks the power to punish conduct that was lawful where it occurred and did not
affect the state's residents).
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2. Full Faith and Credit Constraints
The Court should give the Full Faith and Credit Clause content.
First, statutes, laws, and judgments should receive equal full faith and
credit. As mentioned above, there is no textual basis to distinguish
among them.374 Second, there should be no exceptions to full faith and
credit for judgments, as the Court created in Baker.375 Again, there is no
textual basis for such exceptions. As noted in Part II, the real problem is
the Court's failure to define what full faith and credit means for judg-
ments and its failure to recognize the difference between money judg-
ments and equity judgments.376 While exceptions may not be needed, an
enforcing court in each case needs to judge whether the rendering court
acted within its authority. This is already done in connection with per-
sonal jurisdiction; a court does not have to enforce a judgment if the
judgment court lacked personal jurisdiction over a defendant. 377 Thus,
when a court issues a judgment that purports to bind the courts of other
states, the enforcing court should ask whether the judgment court acted
within its power when it did so. In addition, for equity judgments, a court
should ask which state has the closest connection to the controversy. A
court should not have to enforce another court's injunction when it gov-
erns activity occurring in the forum when the forum has a significantly
closer connection to the conduct.
Most importantly, the Court should give content to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause as it applies to other states' laws. As Professor Lay-
cock has pointed out, "[c]hoice-of-law questions are about the allocation
of authority among the several states. 378 He has also noted that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause "provides for the equal authority of each state's
law.,
379
First, the Court should eliminate the public policy exception that al-
lows a state not to apply foreign law when its selection would violate
state policy.380 If a state's law should govern because that state has the
closest connection to the controversy (or the greatest interest in applying
its laws), then another state should not be able to refuse to apply that law
because it contravenes the forum's public policy. If another state is more
closely connected to a controversy, then applying its laws does not vio-
late the forum's public policy. In addition, if a state refuses to employ the
law of a state that is more closely connected to the controversy because
374. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.
375. See discussion supra Part H.A.2.
376. See discussion supra Part JIB.2.
377. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
378. Laycock, supra note 120, at 250.
379. Id. at 289.
380. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966-67 (1997); see also Laycock, supra note 120, at 313
("The public-policy exception is a relic carried over from international law without reflection on the
changes in interstate relations wrought by the Constitution.").
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the case is being heard in its courts, it is imposing its law on other states.
If a court applies its state's laws when it has the closest connection to the
controversy and another state's laws when that other state has the closest
connection, then both states' policies are satisfied.
The Court should also give content to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause by applying it to choice of law in general. As Professor Laycock
has argued: "[T]he clause is most plausibly read as requiring each state to
give the law of every other state the same faith and credit it gives its own
,,381law-to treat the law of sister states as equal in authority to its own.
Moreover, it is inconsistent to say that a state cannot impose its policies
on another state through punitive damages, but that it can through choice
of law. Therefore, as mentioned above, a court should not be able to ap-
ply its law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to a controversy or
issue when another state has a closer connection to the controversy or
issue. Thus, in the Georgia-California hypothetical from above, the result
would be the same under the Full Faith and Credit Clause as it was under
the Due Process Clause. California law should apply because California
has an interest in regulating California retailers, while Georgia does not.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates that California law govern
because California is the proper sovereign and because Georgia should
not be able to impose its law on California. Further, the Due Process
Clause requires that Georgia not be able to extend its law to govern a
California retailer acting in California with no connection with Georgia.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause Constraints
The Court should also retreat from its position in Walsh. It should
prevent a state from placing externalities on other states, reaping benefits
that belong to other states, extending its laws to control commerce out-
side its borders, and interfering with commerce when a national solution
is needed. As Michael Greve has pointed out, "[t]he prevention of ag-
gression and exploitation among the states is the central, irreducible pur-
pose of the Commerce Clause., 382 Moreover, as James Wilson declared
at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, "whatever object of govern-
ment extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bound[aries] of a
particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of
the United States. 383
Several lower courts have properly applied the dormant commerce
clause rules that were in place before Walsh. For example, Kentucky
refused to apply its civil rights statute to a claim for employment dis-
crimination that took place outside the state against a corporation with its
381. Laycock, supra note 120, at 296.
382. Greve, supra note 15, at 105.
383. 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 424 (2d ed. 1907).
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headquarters in Kentucky.38 4 Similarly, a California court refused to em-
ploy California's Fair Employment and Housing Act in a case involving
a sexual harassment claim against a California company for conduct that
occurred outside California. 385 Lower courts have also used the dormant
commerce clause rules in situations where some of the conduct was in-
state but other conduct was out-of-state. For instance, Shearson Lehman
Bros. Inc. v. Greenberg386 held that a California statute could not be em-
ployed "to impose a nationwide permanent injunction" against a securi-
ties dealer to change its business practices, including changing the format
of its internal account forms and monthly statements and altering its
communications with its customers, because it improperly regulated in-
terstate commerce.387 Similarly, in Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Ser-
vices,388 the court refused to extend Illinois's anti-dilution statute to con-duct that did not affect Illinois on dormant commerce clause grounds.389
In all these cases, application of state law to out-of-state occur-
rences that did not have a significant in-state effect would violate the
dormant commerce clause. A state cannot apply its civil rights laws to
out-of-state conduct just because the company's headquarters is in that
state. In such an instance, a state would be extending its laws beyond its
borders to cover activities in other states. This is also true in cases where
some of the conduct is in-state, such as when a state court issues an in-
junction that covers in-state and out-of-state activities, as in Shearson
Lehman and Hyatt Legal.390 In such instances, the injunction is valid
concerning in-state activity, but the injunction cannot apply to out-of-
state conduct under the dormant commerce clause (or due process) be-
cause a state is extending its laws to govern conduct in another state that
does not have an effect in-state.
However, the dormant commerce clause should not be taken so far
as to preclude a state from regulating injuries from products used within
its borders. 391 The main reason that a strict dormant commerce clause
rule should not apply to products liability cases is that the state is not
regulating interstate commerce when it applies its torts law to a manufac-
turer; it is regulating safety within its borders. When a person is injured
by a product within a state, that state has the strongest interest in making
384. Union Underwear Co. v. Barnhart, 50 S.W.3d 188, 189, 193 (Ky. 2001).
385. Campbell v. Arco Marine, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626, 629, 632-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
386. No. 93-55535, 1995 WL 392028 (9th Cir. July 3, 1995).
387. Greenberg, 1995 WL 392028, at *3.
388. 610 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. 11. 1985).
389. Hyatt Corp., 610 F. Supp. at 385.
390. See Greenberg, 1995 WL 392028, at *3; Hyatt Corp., 610 F. Supp. at 385.
391. Gun manufacturers have recently posed the opposite argument. See Rostron, supra note
346, at 117 ("The gun companies have seized upon the Supreme Court's recent decisions striking
down extraterritorial applications of state law and have argued that those rulings should have a far
broader impact than anyone previously imagined. [Similar to] most products .... most gun injuries
do not occur in the state in which the manufacturer produced and sold the gun, and many occur in a
state in which no distributor or dealer ever sold the gun.").
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sure that the person is compensated for his or her injury. Moreover, regu-
lation of injuries from products in a state can be distinguished from the
regulation of mud flaps on interstate trucks in Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc.39 2 and the length of interstate trains in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona393 on the ground that the product is no longer traveling in inter-
state commerce and a state's purely internal safety regulations cannot
burden interstate commerce. In Bibb, a truck would have to change its
mud flaps at the state border,394 and, in Southern Pacific, a train would
have to change its length at the border.395 There is no comparable burden
concerning products liability.
4. Constraints on a State's Ability to Regulate Its Citizens' Out-of-
State Conduct
Finally, considering horizontal federalism in relation to a state's
ability to regulate its citizens' out-of-state activities will illustrate how
the parts of horizontal federalism work together. Professor Rosen has
argued that "Home States indeed have a presumptive power to regulate
,,396their citizens' out-of-state activities to avoid travel-evasion. In con-
trast, I do not think that states can control their citizens when they are
outside the state to the extent that Professor Rosen does. First, a person
in the United States is both a federal citizen and a citizen of the state in
which they reside.397 Thus, a state lacks complete sovereignty over its
citizens, and it must respect the federal Constitution. A state citizen is not
a child of that state. Second, Professor Rosen understates the importance
of territoriality in connection with state sovereignty. 398 The authority of
392. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
393. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
394. See Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524.
395. See S. Pac., 325 U.S. at 774.
396. Rosen, supra note 115, at 896. Rosen states that "[s]uch 'travel-evasion,' which in effect
gives citizens the power to choose which state's laws are to govern them on an issue-by-issue basis,
can cripple the ability of states to accomplish constitutional objectives." Id. at 856-57; see also
ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1982) (discussing a state's
ability to punish its citizens' extraterritorial activities that violate state criminal laws); C. Steven
Bradford, What Happens if Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion by the States,
35 ARiz. L. REV. 87, 170 (1993) (discussing the extraterritorial effects of regulating abortion if Roe
v. Wade were overturned); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to
Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873, 876 (1993) (discussing state regulation of its
citizens abroad); Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94
(1988) (discussing states' ability to regulate and punish extraterritorial acts except abortion); Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial
Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 462 (1992) (discussing "efforts by
states to punish their citizens for conduct that is protected in [a] sister state where it occurs"); Regan,
Siamese Essays, supra note 20, at 1912 (discussing state regulation of its citizens' extraterritorial
activities); William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v.
Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J.
1677, 1684-85 (discussing evasion of state abortion laws and the ability of states to enforce such
laws extraterritorially on its citizens).
397. U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1.
398. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 964 n.455 ("Finally, I would like to say that I, like Professor
Kreimer, believe that states' physical boundaries are very important. I believe, however, that careful
consideration shows that they are only imperfect surrogates for demarcating where a polity's legiti-
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the states is defined by their borders.399 In addition, as Professor Seth F.
Kreimer has observed, "[tihe Constitution was framed on the premise
that each state's sovereignty over activities within its boundaries ex-
cluded the sovereignty of other states." 4°° While domicile might give a
state power over a person in limited circumstances, the most important
source of power for a state over a person is that the person is within a
state's borders. One state simply cannot invade another state's territory
and dictate what is legal in that state. Third, Professor Rosen overstates
the extent of concurrent jurisdiction. Two states may apply their laws to
the same matter when the occurrence significantly involves both states.
However, the fact that a person is domiciled in a state does not generally
make that person's activities in another state a multi-state matter, invok-
ing concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, Professor Rosen ignores Gore's dic-
tate that one state cannot impose its policy on another state. In fact, Pro-
fessor Rosen does not mention Gore at all. Thus, as Professor Kreimer
has written: "The tradition of American federalism stands squarely
against efforts by states to punish their citizens for conduct that is pro-
tected in the sister state where it occurs." '
Consider two examples: one in which a state does not have an inter-
est in regulating its citizens' out-of-state activities and another where it
does have an interest, at least in part. State X believes that gambling is
mate interests end. This mismatch between physical boundaries and legitimate interests has grown
over time due to various technological revolutions that increase the frequency of cross-border activi-
ties and, in the process, provide citizens ever greater opportunities to structure their activities so as to
free themselves of their Home State's regulations.").
399. See Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 20, at 1887 (stating "[i]n short, territoriality is
presupposed as the relevant criterion of legislative jurisdiction").
The main cases that Professor Rosen uses to support his position are weak. Professor Rosen re-
lies heavily on Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). Rosen, supra note 115, at 865. In this case,
the Supreme Court held that Florida could prohibit its citizens from sponge fishing in an area outside
its territorial waters. Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 79. This case was decided in 1941 at the height of the
Court's hands off approach to state regulation, and before the Court started to impose greater dor-
mant commerce clause regulations on a state's ability to regulate outside its borders. More impor-
tantly, Florida was regulating the high seas, not within the borders of another state; there was no
clash between state sovereigns. Id. at 77.
Professor Rosen also relies on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion), particularly for the fact that the Court allowed jurisdiction partly on the ground that the widow
lived in Minnesota at the time of the lawsuit. Rosen, supra note 115, at 872-73 ("In short, Hague
suggests that bona fide residence on its own is virtually, if not wholly, a sufficient basis for empow-
ering a state to regulate that person's out-of-state activities."). As I stated above, allowing a state to
choose its law solely because a person has moved to a state after an occurrence is a gross violation of
due process and full faith and credit. A state has no interest in what happened to one of its citizens
before he or she moved to that state.
Finally, Professor Rosen cites to In re Busalacchi, No. 59582, 1991 WL 26851 (Mo. Ct. App.
Mar. 5, 1991). Rosen, supra note 115, at 878-79. In this case, a Missouri court prohibited a father
from moving his daughter, who was in a persistent vegetative state, out-of-state, so he could have
her feeding tube removed. Busalacchi, 1991 WL 26851, at *1, *5. However, in this case, the court
was not regulating out-of-state conduct. The court did not prohibit an act from taking place outside
the state. Rather, it prevented the daughter's removal from the nursing home she was currently in
inside Missouri. Id.
400. Kreimer, supra note 396, at 464.
401. Id. at 462.
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immoral, and it wants to protect its citizens who are addicted to gam-
bling, so it passes a law that makes gambling illegal. Can State X extend
its law to cover its citizens' gambling in other states? The answer to this
question should be no. A state should not be able to control its citizens'
conduct beyond its borders when that activity is legal in the other state.
Allowing a state to extend its laws beyond its borders in such an instance
ignores the fact that the person is a federal citizen and offends the per-
son's due process rights by making conduct that is legal in a jurisdiction
illegal.
On the other hand, assume that a same-sex couple wants to get mar-
ried, but that marriages by same-sex couples are illegal in their domicile.
However, marriages of same-sex couples are legal in State Y, so the cou-
ple goes to State Y and gets married. They then come back to their domi-
cile and want it to recognize their marriage and give them the same bene-
fits as other married couples. Does the domicile have to recognize the
marriage? The answer should be no because the domicile has the author-
ity to control marriage status within its territory by its citizens.4 °2
In both the gambling hypothetical and the marriage hypothetical,
state citizens have gone out-of-state to avoid state laws they dislike. The
difference is, in the gambling hypothetical, the activity is wholly out-of-
state, while in the marriage hypothetical, the couple is asking for recog-
nition of their marriage status in their domicile. Obviously, the domicile
could not forbid the couple to get married in another state because it is an
extraterritorial act, but it can refuse to allow any consequences from that
marriage in its territory.
CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that the Rehnquist Court has been in-
consistent in its adjudication of horizontal federalism, creating strong
constraints in the limited area of the effect of the Due Process Clause on
state punitive damages awards, but giving little meaning to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and cutting back on the scope of the dormant com-
merce clause. It has also suggested that the Court should place greater
constraints on a state's ability to extend its laws to interfere with other
states' sovereignty or to unduly burden individuals. This can be accom-
plished by applying the due process principles it used in punitive dam-
ages cases to other types of cases, by giving the Full Faith and Credit
Clause significant content, and by not limiting the scope of the dormant
commerce clause.
402. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1945) (holding that North Carolina
could prosecute a couple for bigamous cohabitation when the North Carolina residents divorced and
remarried in Nevada, then returned to live together in North Carolina). The issue of the recognition
of same-sex marriages is complicated. I believe that in some instances states will have to recognize
same-sex marriage celebrated elsewhere. See generally Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law and Same-
Sex Marriage, 51 FLA. L. REv. 799 (1999).
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The analysis of the Rehnquist Court's horizontal federalism cases
and this Article's suggestions for constraints on horizontal federalism
come from a moderate, pragmatic reading of the constitutional text.4 °3
This Article has advocated giving meaning to all the structural provisions
of the Constitution4°4 and reading these provisions in a detached, value-
free manner.405 The suggestions for greater constraints on horizontal fed-
eralism are an attempt to allocate authority to the proper sovereign, not to
further a political agenda.
403. See REDISH, POLITICAL STRUCTURE, supra note 199, at 9-10. Professor Redish asserts his
concept of pragmatic formalism:
One may legitimately accept that the nature of a constitutional system imposes on the ju-
diciary an obligation to engage in principled, consistent analysis and to make decisions
that are capable of rational reconciliation with governing textual directives, yet simulta-
neously recognize that within those confines there exists room for the judiciary to take at
least some account of pragmatic concerns.
Id.
404. I strongly agree with Professor Redish's declaration that "in our form of constitutional
democracy the Court's role requires that its constitutional pronouncements not contravene the unam-
biguous directives contained in the text of the document that the Court interprets and enforces,
regardless of the Court's assessment of the political or social merits of those directives." Id. at 6. He
added: "Unless the unaccountable judiciary is constrained by the outer boundaries of constitutional
text in invalidating majoritarian action, it is effectively transformed into a philosopher king, sitting in
judgment on the wisdom and morality of all of society's social policy choices." Id. at 8.
405. Cf Fruehwald, The New Federalism, supra note 199, at 865-66 (arguing for similar de-
tachment in the area of vertical federalism).
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